# RESPONSES TO CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ASIA AND AFRICA

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## I. Introduction

The transnational character of climate-related security risks often goes beyond the capacity of national governments to respond adequately. As such, it both creates challenges for and increases the relevance of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).[1] It is, therefore, not only important to understand the climate-related security risks that regions are experiencing but also to analyse how regional IGOs are developing their capacities to deal with these risks. This SIPRI Insights presents the findings of an analysis of four regional IGOs: two in Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC); and two in Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). These IGOs were selected because of their significance as regional institutional actors in some of the world's most fragile and climate-vulnerable areas.

As well as being transnational, climate-related security risks are also multidimensional, meaning that these risks span different security sectors, such as economic, political, military and, of course, environmental security.[2] As climate change creates new challenges for regional organizations, it simultaneously increases their relevance.[3] Indeed, previous research suggests that regional and global IGOs are becoming more involved in the work to mitigate and adapt to climate-related security risks in different parts of the world.[4] In order to explore the organizational responses of the four

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[1] Dellmuth, L. M. et al., 'Inter-governmental organizations and climate security: Advancing the research agenda', *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, vol. 9, no. 1 (2018).

[2] Mobjörk, M. et al., *Climate-Related Security Risks: Towards an Integrated Approach* (SIPRI/ Stockholm University: Stockholm, Oct. 2016). On the significance of broader security sectors, see Wæver, O., *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (St. Martin's Press: New York, 1998).

[3] Dellmuth et al. (note 1).

[4] Bremberg, N., 'European regional organizations and climate-related security risks: EU, OSCE and NATO', SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2018/1, Feb. 2018; Dellmuth et al. (note 1); and

## SUMMARY

● The transnational character of climate-related security risks often goes beyond the capacity of national governments to respond adequately. As such, it creates challenges for and increases the relevance of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). It is, therefore, not only important to understand the climate-related security risks that regions are experiencing but also to analyse how regional IGOs are developing their capacities to deal with these risks.

This SIPRI Insights presents a concise analysis of four regional IGOs—two in Asia and two in Africa. The main findings show that, in various ways, climate-related security risks have found their way into the IGOs' policy frameworks and institutional discourse. Some organizations have been concerned with climate security for several decades. In the case of one organization, climate-related security risks in the form of droughts were part of the very reason it was established. Other organizations identify climate-related security risks as a direct challenge to their mandate to promote prosperity and stability. Overall, it was found that both the regional security context and the regions' vulnerability to climate change affect the framing of climate-related security risks.

selected regional IGOs, this paper uses a comprehensive security lens that accounts for the transnational and multidimensional character of climate-related security risks.[5] The analysis specifically explores three aspects relevant to understanding the response to climate-related security risks: (*a*) how climate security has emerged within each organization; (*b*) the framing and discourse of climate security, that it, how is it conceptualized and what areas are in focus; and (*c*) what actions and measures are being taken in order to respond.

This SIPRI Insights is based on a systematic review of available policy documents published by the four IGOs. The findings from the initial assessment have also been qualified by 14 semi-structured interviews with strategically selected officials from within the organizations, as well as regional experts that work closely with the organizations.[6] Interviewing these actors provides an insight into how the IGOs are addressing climate security, what actions are being taken and, moreover, why.[7] After each organization is briefly described, the main analysis of this paper is structured along two lines: (*a*) institutional discourse, that is, how climate-related security risks are represented in official policy frameworks, and (*b*) institutional action and implementation in the field of climate-related security risks. The concluding remarks then draw lessons from a comparative perspective, considering the implications for policy and research and looking ahead.

*Regional and global IGOs are becoming more involved in the work to mitigate and adapt to climate-related security risks in different parts of the world*

## II. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASEAN was established in August 1967 with the aim to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development, as well as to promote regional peace and stability. ASEAN is currently composed of 10 member states: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. These states assemble twice a year at the ASEAN Summit in order to lead ASEAN's policymaking process, which is implemented through the ASEAN Coordinating Council. ASEAN's administration is structured into three pillars, known as Community Councils: (*a*) the ASEAN Political-Security Community Council (APSC), (*b*) the ASEAN Economic Community Council (AEC), and (*c*) the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council (ASCC). The organization is funded primarily through the ASEAN National Fund, to which member states directly contribute. ASEAN also receives project-specific external

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Oels, A., 'Rendering climate change governable by risk: From probability to contingency', *Geoforum*, vol. 45 (Mar. 2013), pp. 17–29.

[5]  Mobjörk et al. (note 2); and Noble, I. R. et al., 'Adaptation needs and options', eds C. B. Field et al., *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2014).

[6]  Interviews were conducted under the Chatham House Rule, allowing the use of received information without disclosing the identify or affiliation of the interviewee. Identity or affiliation remain undisclosed, as agreed with interviewees. Systematically qualifying document and interview data was done to warrant against potential biases. Further details on the methodology are available on request.

[7]  Richards, D., 'Elite interviewing: Approaches and pitfalls,' *Politics*, vol. 16, no. 3 (Sep. 1996), pp. 199–204.

support, among others, through the European Union (EU) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

Within ASEAN's pillar structure, climate change and environmental issues are dealt with by different directorates and divisions.[8] The ASCC hosts the Sustainable Development Directorate, where both the Environment Division and the Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance division are located. In contrast, the Food, Agriculture and Forestry Division—which deals with food security and the United Nations Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)—is part of the AEC.

## Policy frameworks and discourse

Because of expected climate impacts and the region's social and political capacity to address these, South East Asia is highly vulnerable to climate-related security risks.[9] Accordingly, climate change has gradually become a concern for ASEAN since 2007. The ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability 2007 asserted that the threats posed by climate change should be taken seriously and that ASEAN should commit to enlarging its climate change strategy.[10] Subsequently, ASEAN has repeatedly stressed the need for climate action, for example, in the ASEAN Joint Statement on Climate Change to COP-15 and CMP-5 (15th ASEAN Summit, 2009), the Singapore Resolution on Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change (11th AMME, 2009) and the ASEAN Leaders' Statement on Climate Change to COP-17 and CMP-7 (19th ASEAN Summit, 2016).[11] ASEAN officials identify the Singapore resolution as a key moment in ASEAN's climate security discourse.[12] In the resolution, ASEAN recognized the vulnerability of South East Asia to climate change and stressed its implications for livelihoods, acknowledging that climate change is limiting ASEAN's development options for the future. Further, the state-ment sets out a vision for a community resilient to climate change, working on adaptation, food security and disaster management, and supporting national and global efforts to combat climate change. In 2009, ASEAN announced plans to initiate the ASEAN Climate Change Initiative (ACCI), with the aim of addressing climate change and mitigating its impacts. ASEAN included the ACCI in the Blueprint of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, which was to guide ASEAN towards establishing the ASCC.[13] As such, the ACCI would be institutionally located within the ASCC. The ASEAN Working Group on Climate Change is tasked

*ASEAN recognized the vulnerability of South East Asia to climate change and stressed its implications for livelihoods, acknowledging that climate change is limiting ASEAN's development options for the future*

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[8] ASEAN official no. 1, Interview with authors via Skype, 24 Jan. 2018; and ASEAN official no. 2, Interview with authors via Skype, 8 Feb. 2018.

[9] ADB, 'A region at risk: The human dimensions of climate change in Asia and the Pacific', 2017.

[10] ASEAN, Declaration on Environmental Sustainability, 20 Nov. 2007.

[11] ASEAN, 'Singapore resolution on environmental sustainability and climate change', 29 Oct. 2009; and ASEAN, 'Joint statement on climate change to the 15th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 5th session of the Conference of Parties serving as the Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol', 24 Oct. 2009.

[12] ASEAN official no. 1 (note 8).

[13] ASEAN, 'Blueprint of the ASEAN socio-cultural community', section D.10, 2009.

with monitoring the implementation of climate change measures set out in the ASCC Blueprint.

Additionally, ASEAN has developed several frameworks that focus especially on food security, as well as those that focus on disaster management. The framework for food security is set within the AEC, through the Multi-Sectoral Framework on Climate Change and Food Security, which was established during a meeting of the ASEAN Ministers on Agriculture and Forestry in 2009 and has its own coordination structure. There is also a mechanism built into the ASEAN Ad-Hoc Steering Committee on Climate Change and Food Security that aims to incorporate other sectors and actors from within ASEAN, but has seen only limited success.[14] Furthermore, the 2009 Strategic Plan of Action on Food Security focuses on emergency and shortage relief, sustainable food trade and integrated food security information systems, and it builds the base for the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve Agreement of 2011.[15] Since 2013, ASEAN has actively promoted climate-resilient agriculture, with support from the German Corporation for International Cooperation, among others.[16] Within the Food, Agriculture and Forestry Division, migration is increasingly becoming an issue, but knowledge of its impacts are still lacking.[17] For disaster management, on the other hand, the framework is set within the ASCC, through the Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response 2010–15, which focuses on risk assessment, early warning, mitigation, response and recovery.[18] Another notable framework related to climate change is the Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation 2010–2015, which tackles all aspects of energy security, from grid and pipeline integration to energy efficiency, renewables and clean coal technology.[19]

*ASEAN has actively promoted climate-resilient agriculture since 2013*

**Policy implementation**

Most of the policy frameworks mentioned above are either still in the planning phase or only in an early implementation phase. The ACCI has so far realized several projects, notably relating to resilient cities and the risks and impacts of extreme weather events. In 2007, individual departments, such as the Food, Agriculture and Forestry Division, began enhanced discussions and action on REDD+ and clean development mechanisms. According to interviews, ASEAN started in 2013 to promote and implement climate resilience in agriculture with support from Germany.[20]

With natural disasters increasing in both number and size and affecting millions of people in South East Asia, there were substantial implementation efforts related to disaster management. In 2009 the ASEAN Disaster

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[14] ASEAN official no. 1 (note 8).
[15] ASEAN, 'ASEAN integrated food security (AIFS) and strategic plan of action on food security in the ASEAN region (spa-fs) 2009–13', 2009; and ASEAN, 'ASEAN plus three emergency rice reserve (APTERR) Agreement', 7 Oct. 2011.
[16] ASEAN official no. 2 (note 8).
[17] ASEAN official no. 2 (note 8).
[18] ASEAN, 'Agreement on disaster management and emergency response work programme for 2010–15', 24 Dec. 2009.
[19] ASEAN, '2010–15 ASEAN plan of action for energy cooperation', 29 July 2009.
[20] ASEAN official no. 2 (note 8).

Management and Emergency Relief Fund was established, following the Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response.[21] The fund is supported by voluntary contributions from member states and external actors. As such, several initiatives relating to disaster response are implemented in partnership with external donors, notably Australia, Japan and the EU. According to one ASEAN official, the ASCC is currently conducting a study of coastal vulnerability in order to assess the risks to coastal cities. The same official emphasized the need for a comprehensive risk assessment of the climate security risks within the region, which at this point is still missing.[22]

*With natural disasters increasing in both number and size and affecting millions of people in South East Asia, disaster management saw substantial implementation efforts*

Action on food security came to the fore during the 2008 and 2011 global food crises. ASEAN initiated the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve to provide immediate risk response and guarantee food security, but also to have a mechanism to control the price of rice.[23] Contributions were provided both in the form of financial resources and in the provision of rice grain. Support was provided by China, Japan and South Korea. However, according to ADB experts, implementation stalled, with the rice reserve not at the required level and questions about physical distribution remaining unresolved.[24]

**Challenges and ways forward**

ASEAN has recognized the security challenges that climate change is posing. As reflected in the policy documents, climate change is seen as a risk to prosperity and stability in the region, thereby challenging ASEAN's mandate. Yet, according to several of the documents that were reviewed and interviews that were conducted, the organization appears to be facing challenges to the implementation of an effective climate policy. Three factors that inhibit ASEAN's climate change policy are: (*a*) the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention, (*b*) insufficient coordination within ASEAN, and (*c*) a lack of commitment by member states to act.

In turn, these factors present visible challenges with respect to which policies are implemented. Disasters and responses to them receive a great deal of attention and require pre-emptive action. So too does food security, which became visible in 2011 when food price shocks affected multiple states in the region. However, the long-term strategic coordination and implementation of policies are lagging behind, with the limited commitment of member states and the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention remaining among the major obstacles.

The multiple divisions within ASEAN's organizational structure make it difficult to effectively address climate-related security risks, which are both cross-sectoral and transnational. As climate issues are dealt with by two

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[21] ASEAN (note 18).

[22] ASEAN official no. 1 (note 8).

[23] ASEAN (note 15); and Asian Development Bank official no. 1 and no. 2, Interview with authors via Skype, 24 Aug. 2017. Even though the rice harvest in South East Asia was not directly affected in 2011, rice prices in the region spiked following global insecurity around food.

[24] Asian Development Bank official no. 3, Interview with authors via Skype, 13 Sep. 2017.

pillars and coordination between the divisions is currently weak, there is a clear need to improve coordination. The current coordination mechanisms received mixed responses from ASEAN staff.[25] It appears that the problem is the lack of a centrally led coordination mechanism. Given that climate-related security risks threaten both the security of member states and the organizational mandate as such, it is noteworthy that the financially and politically strongest pillar—the APSC—does not deal with climate change issues. A stronger political-security focus seems necessary to deal with climate risks, with the events in the aftermath of the 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar demonstrating this. In the wake of the cyclone, it was ASEAN's political pressure on Myanmar that allowed UN relief efforts access to affected areas.

*A stronger political-security focus seems necessary to deal with climate risks*

## III. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SAARC was established in December 1985 in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Its eight member states are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. SAARC works to coordinate and monitor the implementation of its activities through its Secretariat in Kathmandu, Nepal, which is headed by the Secretary General (appointed for a three-year term, rotating among member states). SAARC summits are held every second year and assemble the heads of state as SAARC's highest decision-making authority. However, no SAARC Summit has been held since 2014.[26] Several informants and regional experts seriously question the future of the organization.[27] Nevertheless, SAARC's member states are continuing to work on climate change-related security risks on a unilateral and bilateral basis.

SAARC is structured into three types of committees: (*a*) the Standing Committee, (*b*) the Programming Committee, and (*c*) the Technical Committees. The Standing Committee and the Programming Committee collaborate on measures and decisions relating to the overall monitoring and coordination of programmes in several areas. They are also in charge of project approval and the modalities of financing. The Technical Committees are comprised of member state representatives and are structured into six areas: Agriculture and Rural Development; Health and Population Activities; Women, Youth and Children; Science and Technology; Transport; and Environment. Each of these departments is responsible for the implementation of projects and programmes within their specific area.

### Policy frameworks and discourse

South Asian states are extremely vulnerable to a range of climate impacts, ranging from shrinking glaciers and water scarcity to floods and rising sea levels. Shifting monsoon patterns and heat waves place noticeable stress on these states, whose primary employment sector is agriculture.

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[25] ASEAN official no. 1 (note 8); and ASEAN official no. 2 (note 8).

[26] Following the 2016 Uri attacks in Kashmir, all member states, except Nepal, cancelled attendance of the planned 2016 summit in Pakistan.

[27] Personal communications with regional experts during the workshop, 'Climate change and resource security in South Asia: Exploring security risks of climate change', Colombo, 30 Nov. 2017.

As such, heads of states within SAARC expressed 'their deep concern' for the regional challenges related to environmental degradation and climate change in the 1987 SAARC Kathmandu Declaration. They have recognized that these challenges are 'severely undermining the development process and prospects of the member countries', and they have 'decided to intensify regional cooperation with a view to strengthening their disaster management capabilities'.[28] In order to do so, SAARC commissioned a study on the Protection and Preservation of the Environment and the Causes and Consequences of Natural Disasters, which was finalized in 1991.[29] The Technical Committee on Environment, established in 1992, was subsequently tasked with identifying measures for immediate action and deciding modalities for implementation. Since then, its mandate has been expanded to also include forestry.

In several declarations, SAARC has expressed a concern for environmental issues, including climate change. However, it took until 2005—in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami—that SAARC members agreed on concrete actions to address natural disasters. Despite the fact that this event was not caused by climate change, the frameworks established by member states in the aftermath address both natural and climate-related disasters. Indeed, the Comprehensive Framework on Disaster Management (2006–15) is aligned with the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005–15) of the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR).[30] Part of the framework led to the creation of the SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC) in October 2006, in order to advise policy and facilitate capacity building.[31] In 2008, SAARC agreed on the Natural Disaster Rapid Response Mechanism under the guidance of the SDMC, in order to adopt a coordinated and planned approach to natural disasters.[32] In November 2016, the SDMC merged the SAARC Meteorological Research Centre, the SAARC Forestry Centre and the SAARC Coastal Zone Management Centre.[33]

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Climate-related security risks, beyond natural disasters, were broadly emphasized in the 2007 Declaration of the 14th SAARC Summit, with heads of state expressing 'deep concern over global climate change and the consequent rise in sea level and its impact on the lives and livelihoods in the region'.[34] Consequently, they called for cooperation on climate action, including early warning and knowledge sharing for 'pursuing a climate resilient development in South Asia'.[35] This resulted in the three-year SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change in 2008, which identifies seven thematic areas of cooperation— among which adaptation, mitigation, and management of impacts and risk deal with climate change-related

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[28] SAARC, Kathmandu Declaration, 4 Nov. 1987.

[29] SAARC, 'Regional study on the causes and consequences of natural disasters and the protection and preservation of the environment', SAARC Secretariat, 1992.

[30] SAARC, 'Comprehensive framework on disaster management', Apr. 2007; and UNISDR, 'Hyogo framework for action (2005–15)', Jan. 2005.

[31] SAARC Disaster Management Centre, *SAARC Disaster Management Framework*, [n.d.].

[32] SAARC, Agreement on rapid response to natural disasters, 11 Nov. 2011.

[33] SAARC (note 31).

[34] SAARC, Declaration of the 14th SAARC Summit, 4 Apr. 2007.

[35] SAARC (note 34).

security risks.[36] The accompanying SAARC Environment Ministers Dhaka Declaration on Climate Change notably emphasizes 'that climate change is substantively the result of the greenhouse gas emissions by the developed world for over two centuries'.[37] The latter statement is connected to the demand to receive international financial support, a common demand of many developing regions.[38] In 2010, following the Thimphu Statement on Climate Change, SAARC established an Expert Group on Climate Change to ensure policy direction and guidance for regional cooperation.[39] Within most SAARC declarations, the role of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) is emphasized as a focal point of climate action. SAARC does not provide climate-related financing, thus most of the climate-related projects are implemented at a national level through the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) within the UNFCCC framework.

*Within most SAARC declarations, the role of the UNFCCC and the NAPAs is emphasized as a focal point of climate action*

SAARC also has specific frameworks for food security, such as the 1987 Agreement on Establishing the SAARC Food Security Reserve, which had several problems with becoming effectively operational.[40] In 2004 SAARC endorsed a proposal to create a Regional Food Bank, which was then established in 2007.[41] In 2011 SAARC member states agreed to establish a SAARC Seed Bank, however, it is hardly functional and has only been ratified by five countries.[42] Finally, the Framework for Material Transfer Agreement is an Annex to the Seed Bank Agreement that establishes a mechanism for the exchange of seeds and other materials, in order to achieve food security and address natural and man-made disasters.

**Policy implementation**

Despite a significant number of declarations to combat climate change and its security risks, many policies are still not operational, and others are yet to be agreed. As some scholars point out: 'often institutions are established but they remain limited in their ability to produce concrete results in accordance with declarations, conventions and action plans produced at SAARC.'[43]

One such example is the SAARC Food Bank, which was first launched in 1987, then relaunched in 2004. Following two floods in 2017, Bangladesh faced food insecurity, but could not utilize the SAARC Food Bank due to inadequate reserves, an overburdening bureaucratic procedure, and complicated financial details in terms of pricing and funding.[44] Also the SDMC—which was initiated to advise on policy and facilitate capacity

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[36] SAARC, 'SAARC action plan on climate change', 2008.

[37] SAARC, Environment Ministers Dhaka Declaration on Climate Change, July 2008.

[38] Habib, H., 'SAARC action plan on climate change', *The Hindu*, 5 July 2008. See also Ahmed, Z. S., *Regionalism and Regional Security in South Asia* (Routledge: London, 2016).

[39] SAARC, 'Thimphu statement on climate change', Apr. 2010.

[40] SAARC, 'Agreement on establishing the SAARC food security reserve', 4 Nov. 1987.

[41] SAARC, 'Agreement on establishing the SAARC regional food bank', 4 Apr. 2007.

[42] SAARC, 'Agreement on establishing the SAARC seed bank', 11 Nov. 2011.

[43] Ahmed (note 38).

[44] Farin, S. M. and Bari, E., 'Going regional to tackle local food crisis', *Daily Star*, 16 Oct. 2017.

building on natural disaster response—is currently undergoing reform and has, so far, produced little work.[45]

Nevertheless, in SAARC implemented the South Asia Disaster Knowledge Network (SADKN), which is mainly funded by the World Bank's Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery through UNISDR. The SADKN is a significant platform for sharing knowledge and information about disaster risk reduction management in South Asia. However, cooperation within the SADKN only exists on a bilateral level and through alternative regional configurations. In particular, smaller South Asian states, such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, the Maldives and Sri Lanka, have increased their climate security collaboration on a state level and through non-governmental pathways. One of these initiatives is the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, which brings together the national disaster management organizations of different states in the region to facilitate the implementation of disaster and climate risk management.[46]

*The SADKN is a significant platform for sharing knowledge and information about disaster risk reduction management in South Asia*

Despite limited regional implementation, on the national level, SAARC's Action Plan on Climate Change led some SAARC countries to implement the NAPAs that are aligned with SAARC's regional strategy. These plans were mainly funded by external organizations such as the UNFCCC through the LDCF.

**Challenges and ways forward**

SAARC is not only facing tremendous challenges in terms of implementing climate-related security policies, but—as several regional and international experts point out—it is facing an existential crisis. The existence of a substantial climate security discourse within the organization has been visible for three decades but, despite this, policy implementation has never materialized. The reasons for this are beyond climate change policy and are part of the larger political and institutional dynamics of the region.

Foremost, poor relations between member states within SAARC hinder its institutional capability. Trust among South Asian states is extremely low, and this disrupts the effective implementation of climate-related security policies.[47] As regional experts point out, this distrust even affects the organization in rather sensitive traditional security sectors.[48] Distrust, especially of India as the regional power, creates difficulties for policy implementation. Using its status, India resists taking up bilateral issues at the regional level, thereby undermining the utility of SAARC.[49] In response, India has proposed a South Asian disaster relief force outside of SAARC. However, this idea has been met with apprehension from smaller member states that consider it a tool to broaden India's military supremacy in the

[45] Notably, India recently proposed a South Asian disaster relief force outside of SAARC, indicating little trust in the SAARC mechanism. South Asia regional expert no. 1, Personal communication with authors via email, 6 Mar. 2018.

[46] South Asia regional expert no. 2, Interview with authors, Solna, 6 Mar. 2018.

[47] Swain, A., 'South Asia, its environment and regional institutions', eds L. Elliott and S. Breslin, *Comparative Environmental Regionalism* (Routledge: London, 2011).

[48] Ahmed (note 38).

[49] Swain (note 47).

region.[50] Dynamic geopolitical developments in South Asia add another dimension to the distrust and power struggles. China is increasingly influential and cooperating with smaller states like Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka; moreover, China's long-standing support to Pakistan both reduces India's influence in the region and limits its bargaining position.

Looking forward, it is uncertain whether SAARC has a future. Some see a focus on common human security issues, including climate change, as a possible avenue to facilitate cooperation.[51] Others specifically demand that India changes its policy towards its neighbours.[52] Given the unquestionable risk that climate change is posing to the region, cooperation among states in South Asia is essential for any serious attempt at adaptation and mitigation. Currently, it is unclear whether this will happen with or without SAARC.

*Cooperation among states in South Asia is essential for any serious attempt at adaptation and mitigation*

## IV. The Economic Community of West African States

ECOWAS was established in 1975 with the goal of promoting the economic integration of its 15 member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The Authority of Heads of State and Government of Member States (the Authority) is the highest institution within ECOWAS and determines its general policy and major guidelines. The Authority sometimes delegates topical issues to the Council of Ministers, which can in turn provide recommendations. ECOWAS is managed through the Executive Commission of ECOWAS, which is elected for a four-year mandate. The ECOWAS Parliament serves as a consulting institution for the Authority and consists of 115 seats that are distributed among the member states. ECOWAS also has a judicial arm, the Community Court of Justice, which is tasked with interpreting the provisions of the ECOWAS Treaty and settling disputes between member states. The Community Court of Justice addresses complaints from both member states and institutions within ECOWAS.

ECOWAS has several specialized technical commissions, including on Food and Agriculture; Industry, Science and Technology and Energy; the Environment and Natural Resources; Political, Judicial and Legal Affairs, Regional Security and Immigration. As such, issues related to climate change are dealt with by a cross section of commissions, such as the Food and Agriculture commission, the Industry, Science and Technology and Energy Commission, and the Environment and Natural Resources Commission.

### Policy frameworks and discourse

Although the interviews with ECOWAS officials showed a strong awareness of the relationship between climate change and conflict, this link is not made explicit in ECOWAS's policy frameworks and discourse.[53] Rather than climate security, ECOWAS is among the few regional organizations that

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[50] South Asia regional expert no.1 (note 46).
[51] Ahmed (note 38).
[52] Swain (note 47).
[53] ECOWAS official no. 1 and no. 2, Interview with authors via Skype, 23 Feb. 2018.

have specifically recognized *environmental* security as an area of concern. The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999) clearly states that humanitarian, natural and environmental crises can undermine the region's security.[54] Nevertheless, it was not until 2008 with the ECOWAS Environmental Policy that environmental issues were adopted into a solid policy framework for the first time, with the aim of harmonizing and coordinating national policies to protect the environment and promote ECOWAS's work in the areas of agriculture and natural resources.[55] In the policy, member states further agree to commit themselves to the principles of the UNFCCC. Importantly, ECOWAS links its environmental policy directly to peace and prosperity, stating that 'the environmental policy proposes the vision of a peaceful, dignified and prosperous ECOWAS region whose various and productive natural resources are preserved and managed on sustainable basis for the development and equilibrium of the sub-region'.[56] As such, ECOWAS recognizes 'the negative impacts of conflicts on the sustainable management of natural resources in the sub-region'.[57]

The language and content of these environmental policies are closely linked to the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, also adopted in 2008. This document identifies environmental degradation as a structural factor in relation to conflicts.[58] The document explicitly recognizes the 'illegal exploitation of natural resources' as an issue in recent armed conflicts in the region, and consequently lists good natural resource governance as one of the benchmarks to 'strengthen human security and incorporate conflict prevention activities (operational and structural) as well as aspects of peace-building'.[59]

In the wake of increasing food insecurity in the region, ECOWAS has focused special attention on 'transhumance conflicts', that is, conflicts between herders who seasonally migrate with their herds and often come into conflict with farmers. The issue became salient in May 2010 when a meeting of ECOWAS Ministers of Agriculture, Trade and Humanitarian Affairs issued the following statement: 'the food and nutritional situation has been compounded by a pastoral crisis which has compelled increased pastoralist migration southward and increased conflicts between farmers and pastoralists.'[60] The crisis has deepened over the years due to progressive desertification that has pushed herders further southward and due to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This has resulted in ECOWAS continually issuing statements and frameworks centred around agriculture and food security. Among these statements was the ECOWAS Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP) in 2005, which was framed by the African Union's

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[54]  ECOWAS, 'Protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security', 10 Dec. 1999.

[55]  ECOWAS, 'ECOWAS environmental policy', 2008.

[56]  ECOWAS (note 55), p. 13.

[57]  ECOWAS (note 55), pp. 5, 11.

[58]  ECOWAS, 'Conflict prevention framework', 16 Jan. 2008.

[59]  ECOWAS (note 58), pp. 11, 16.

[60]  ECOWAS, 'Ministers of Agriculture, Trade, Humanitarian Affairs meet in Lome on food crisis in West Africa', Press Release 083/2010, 18 May 2010.

Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP). Other statements include the Regional Agricultural Investment Plan (RAIP) and, at a national level, the National Agricultural Investment programmes (NAIPs).[61] Notably, none of these frameworks concretely frames transhumance conflict in relation to climate change.

**Policy implementation**

Despite all its efforts and the solid policy framework on the context of environmental security and conflict established by ECOWAS, there are evident gaps between regional strategies and implementation of policies, as plans are implemented at the member state level. Overall, the NAIPs and NAPAs seem to be aligned with ECOWAS's regional objectives, but in the reviewed documents and interviews there is no evidence of the implementation of the RAIPs.

Although ECOWAS recognizes the connection between climate change and conflict, this link has not been specifically studied by the organization. Instead, ECOWAS has focused on the role that natural resources play in conflicts. Currently, the Environment Directorate addresses the topic by cooperating with other directorates, such as the Directorate of Political Affairs, Peace and Security and the ECOWAS Commission, to underline the role of climate change in causing and resolving conflict.[62] Although different departments deal with climate change-related challenges, there is no specific project to address these challenges other than the Early Warning Directorate.[63] ECOWAS is trying to develop its early warning capacity, and in relation to climate change too; accordingly, it has signed a memorandum of understanding with the African Risk Capacity to Strengthen West African Climate Resilience.[64] Overall, experts have noted that ECOWAS responds more to 'hot button' issues like maritime security, peace operations and terrorism.[65]

*There are evident gaps between regional strategies and implementation of policies, as plans are implemented at the member state level*

Meanwhile, transhumance conflicts are the most pressing area of concern for ECOWAS's staff and observers.[66] It has conducted a study on this issue, but the complexity and multicausality of transhumance conflict make it difficult to conceptualize in relation to climate change. Some observers are concerned that, aside from rhetoric, there has been little awareness of and no high-level commitment to addressing transhumance conflict.[67] However, ECOWAS has made an effort to limit herders' easy access that have to small

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[61]  There are further frameworks that lay beyond the scope of the study. ECOWAS recognized the importance of climate change and its relation to energy security, it agreed on the creation of the ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE) with the Ouagadougou Declaration, adopted at the ECOWAS Conference for Peace and Security in 2007 in Burkina Faso. A year later, during the 61st Session of ECOWAS Council of Ministers, the ECOWAS Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency was established with the C/REG.23/11/08. The centre takes care of matters related to climate change security.

[62]  ECOWAS official no. 1 and no. 2 (note 53).

[63]  ECOWAS official no. 1 and no. 2 (note 53).

[64]  ECOWAS, 'African Risk Capacity and ECOWAS sign memorandum of understanding to strengthen West African climate resilience', 10 Nov. 2017.

[65]  West Africa regional expert no. 1 and no. 2, Interview with authors via Skype, 26 Jan. 2018.

[66]  All interviews of ECOWAS officials and West Africa regional experts.

[67]  West Africa regional expert no. 1 (note 65).

arms and light weapons.[68] Some regional experts view this as an important component of addressing transhumance violence, while other conflict resolution experts question whether this will stop the violence, since it does not resolve the root cause of conflict.[69] To that end, it is important to note that the NAPAs in some countries include the strengthening of resilience to climate change through integrated agricultural and pastoral management. These policies would more effectively target the root causes of transhumance conflict.

*The complexity and multicausality of transhumance conflict make it difficult to conceptualize in relation to climate change*

The range of issues facing ECOWAS—such as lack of interdepartmental cooperation, weak links to climate change and dependence on external funding (both from UN agencies and donors)—clearly limits coherence between regional strategies and national policies.[70] In addition, as its staff have pointed out, ECOWAS currently lacks the capacity to develop its own projects despite large sums of external funding.[71]

**Challenges and ways forward**

When compared to the other organizations in this paper, ECOWAS is one of the organizations most explicit in its recognition and framing of environmental and natural resource issues in terms of peace and security. However, despite an advanced discourse and recognition of these dynamics, climate change is only marginally visible at ECOWAS. Documents and interviews indicate that the organization is facing challenges to the implementation of effective climate security policies, with the three most critical challenges being: (*a*) a lack of linking natural resources and environmental change to climate change, (*b*) capability constraint and donor dependency, and (*c*) a shortage of commitment from member states to act. Only the first challenge is explicitly linked to climate change, whereas the other two are implicitly so. Nevertheless, the latter two inhibit the functioning of environmental security policy frameworks.

ECOWAS's capability constraint is coupled with the prevalence among member states of the principle of state sovereignty over domestic affairs. In particular, ECOWAS's relations with Nigeria, the regional hegemon, hinders the organization from producing a coordinated response at times. For example, the organization is unable to respond to the Niger Delta conflict or the Boko Haram insurgency, since intervention would challenge state sovereignty. The Lake Chad crisis is illustrative of the severity and transnational character of climate-related security risks and how these risks interact with other political and social dynamics in the region. In order for ECOWAS to adequately respond, there is a need to increase internal coordination and to strengthen the cross-sectoral exchange of knowledge considering the cross-sectoral dimensions of climate change. From interviews, it is clear that officials recognize the link between natural

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[68] ECOWAS, 'ECOWAS Convention on small arms and light weapons, their ammunition and other related materials'.

[69] West Africa regional expert no. 1 (note 65); and West Africa regional expert no. 5, Interview with authors, Solna, 12 Mar. 2018.

[70] West Africa regional expert no. 3, Interview with authors, Stockholm, 22 Aug. 2017.

[71] ECOWAS official no. 1 and no. 2 (note 53).

resource issues and climate change in the region, but this has not translated into an explicit climate security framework. For example, emerging cooperation between ECOWAS and the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel is one such initiative that exemplifies a willingness towards new framing and better implementation of a climate security framework. The same is true concerning the control of small arms in relation to transhumance conflicts. However, the Lake Chad crisis is also demonstrative of the limitations of regional organizations and the need for higher levels of governance, in this case the African Union (AU), to become actively involved.

## V. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IGAD was established in 1996, with the aim of bolstering economic integration and facilitating cooperation in food security and environmental protection. IGAD undertakes this mission through the promotion of peace and security and humanitarian affairs.[72] Its eight member states are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.[73] IGAD's central policymaking body is the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government, which decides its objectives and projects. The Council of Ministers is IGAD's executive arm, formulating and approving policies and programmes. The Executive Secretary is assigned by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government for a four-year term and is tasked with assisting member states in formulating and developing policies, as well as facilitating their coordination and harmonization.

*IGAD's Climate Prediction and Application Centre has played a pivotal role in framing its policies on climate change*

IGAD is structured into four divisions, in accordance with the organization's vision and objectives: (*a*) the Agriculture and Environment division, (*b*) the Peace and Security division, (*c*) the Economic Cooperation division, and (*d*) the Social Development division. Besides these main divisions, IGAD has several specialized institutions and programmes hosted by member states. These include the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and the IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre (ICPAC), both of which deal with climate-related security risks.

### Policy frameworks and discourse

Although climate change and drought are at the core of IGAD's agenda, the organization only created a specific climate change strategy in 2015. Nevertheless, IGAD approved a Food Security Strategy in 1990, with a five-year programme adopted in 1992. Problems in implementation, however, led to the revised IGAD Food Security Strategy for 2005–2008.[74] From 2003, the Environment and Natural Resources Strategy provided IGAD with a more comprehensive regional framework for dealing with risks related to climate

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[72] In 1986, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya established IGAD's predecessor, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), which focused only on development and environmental control.

[73] Eritrea self-suspended its membership during the period 2007–11.

[74] IGAD, 'IGAD food security strategy', Feb. 2005.

change, especially as regards food security and migration.[75] But it was only in 2016—following the Paris Agreement—that the IGAD Regional Climate Change Strategy for 2016–2030 was adopted. This strategy provided a comprehensive policy framework for the organization and was subsequently expanded into the IGAD Strategy and Implementation Plan for 2016–20. The plan is structured into a five-year strategy with four pillars: (*a*) Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment, (*b*) Economic Cooperation, Integration and Social Development, (*c*) Peace and Security and Humanitarian Affairs, and (*d*) Corporate Development Services.[76]

IGAD's Climate Prediction and Application Centre has played a pivotal role in framing its policies on climate change. The 2003 Disaster Risk Reduction Programme highlights the importance of disaster risk reduction in the Greater Horn of Africa region, dealing with the effects of climate impacts such as droughts on migration and conflict. Following a severe drought in the region during 2010–11 and the ineffectiveness of IGAD's drought response approach, the 2011 Nairobi Summit led to the adoption of the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI), which promotes innovative sustainable development strategies, policies and programmes at member state and regional levels, aimed at building resilience to future climatic and economic shocks.[77] Other notable frameworks include the 2012 Regional Migration Policy Framework to support internally displaced persons from disasters, including environmental ones.[78]

## Policy implementation

The implementation of most IGAD projects has been possible due to donor financing. In fact, only 5–10 per cent of programme funding comes from member states, making the organization highly dependent on external funding sources. Moreover, the intergovernmental nature of IGAD means that all policies have to be implemented at the state level, leaving IGAD with the task of coordinating and harmonizing state policies. However, even this coordination is limited, as tensions between member states and regional bureaucracy often arise, with the result that many treaties and regional projects are yet to be implemented.[79]

*Only 5–10 per cent of programme funding comes from member states, making the organization highly dependent on external funding sources*

According to officials in the Peace and Security division, IGAD has not performed a risk assessment on the climate change–security nexus.[80] However, collaboration between CEWARN and ICPAC on possible climate change and security issues started in 2011.[81] This led to the adoption of the Transhumance Protocol, through which member states share information about herders' movements. Despite some success, its scope remains limited as observers and staff note that internal issues are off the table due to sovereignty concerns.[82] Moreover, observers note a lack of resources and the

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[75] IGAD, 'Environment and natural resources strategy', Apr. 2007.
[76] IGAD, 'IGAD regional strategy: Volume 2: implementation plan 2016–2020', Jan. 2016, p. 2.
[77] IGAD, 'About IDDRSI'.
[78] IGAD, 'IGAD regional migration policy framework', 11 July 2012.
[79] IGAD officer no. 1, Interview with authors via Skype, 23 Feb. 2018.
[80] IGAD officer no. 2, Personal communication with authors via email, 2 Feb. 2018.
[81] IGAD officer no. 1 (note 79).
[82] IGAD officer no. 1 (note 79).

porous borders as barriers preventing the success of the protocol.[83] Overall, coordination between CEWARN and ICPAC needs further improvement.

The adoption of the IDDRSI in 2011 represented a step forward for IGAD's policy implementation. The IDDRSI is harmonized at the member state level through the creation of state programming papers that identify the particular circumstances and resilience needs. Concurrently, regional programming papers address the regional dimension and the priorities for cross-border cooperation.[84] However, the IDDRSI is highly donor-driven, making it vulnerable to changes in funding streams and donor priorities.

### Challenges and ways forward

Since climate security is implicitly part of IGAD's mandate, it is not surprising to find explicit references to climate-related security risks in its policy documents. Despite these references, IGAD needs time to reach a level where implementation is possible. Like other regional organizations, IGAD is constrained by state sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention. Interregional issues between states and near continuous civil wars and communal conflicts have limited IGAD's influence and its ability to build trust. As such, managing transhumance conflict—which is amplified by climate and environmental change in the region—is increasingly difficult. Part of the reason is the influx of small arms, as well as the exploitation of migration patterns by arms smugglers.[85]

As discussed above, external observers note multifaceted problems regarding the implementation of IGAD's climate security policy. While it is widely acknowledged that IGAD has limited implementation capacity, some experts argue that it should set norms rather than implement policy.[86]

*The dependency on external donors inhibits regional cooperation and locally formed climate security policy*

Currently, the Secretariat maintains that it can both set norms and implement policies, primarily because it allows IGAD to mobilize external financing. Indeed, IGAD's dependency on external donors is a challenge. Experts predict that IGAD will continue to increase its programmes and projects and to mobilize resources, however, still with only limited strategic oversight and policy coherence.[87] As such, the dependency on external donors inhibits regional cooperation and locally formed climate security policy.

Looking forward, IGAD needs to strengthen the coordination of its programmes. IGAD requires a deeper understanding of climate-related security risks within the organization in order to better integrate the analysis provided by CEWARN and ICPAC into the work of the organization, especially the Peace and Security division. CEWARN's capacity for data collection in the field also requires support both in light of transhumance conflicts and the increasing climate and environmental impacts fostering insecurity.[88] Increasing CEWARN's data sources would directly improve its ability to

[83] East Africa regional expert no. 1, Interview with authors via Skype, 2 Feb. 2018.

[84] IGAD, 'The IDDRSI Strategy', Jan. 2013.

[85] East Africa Regional expert no. 1 (note 83).

[86] East Africa Regional expert no. 1 (note 83).

[87] East Africa Regional expert no. 1 (note 83).

[88] Van Baalen, S. and Mobjörk, M., 'Climate change and violent conflict in East Africa: Integrating qualitative and quantitative research to probe the mechanisms', *International Studies Review* (10 Nov. 2017).

provide improved early warning to states and communities. Therefore, in order to facilitate a more coherent climate security policy, donors should focus their funding support on strengthening existing institutions such as CEWARN and ICPAC.

## VI. Implications for policy and research

Climate-related security risks have been identified as a growing concern for policymakers across all four of the IGOs considered in this paper. In various ways, these risks have found their way into policy frameworks and the institutional discourse. Some organizations, such as SAARC and IGAD, have been concerned with climate security for several decades. In the case of IGAD, climate-related security risks in the form of droughts were part of the very reason it was established. Other organizations, such as ASEAN, identify climate-related security risks as a direct challenge to their mandate to promote prosperity and stability in the South East Asian region. The regional security context and the vulnerability to climate change thereby both affect the framing of these risks. For example, ASEAN and SAARC have a strong emphasis on disaster management, stemming from the fact that their member states are located in areas of the globe exposed to natural disasters.

*Climate-related security risks have been identified as a growing concern for policymakers across all four of the IGOs considered in this paper*

Food security, caused by droughts or natural disasters, is a major concern for all four IGOs. ECOWAS's focus on environmental issues and natural resources appears to originate from its experience with the role that natural resources played during recent conflicts. While there is an awareness of climate change among ECOWAS officials, the policy frameworks focus too narrowly on the implications of natural resources rather than on climate change. This is notably different within IGAD, even though the major consequence—transhumance conflict—is the same in both organizations.

Despite the growing awareness of climate-related security risks within the four IGOs, the key challenge that remains is policy implementation. Like many other regional organizations, issues of sovereignty endure as the major inhibitors of successful implementation. This is further amplified in regions where high levels of distrust exist among states, as the case of South Asia illustrates. Another limitation is the division of climate security issues across several departments and organizational silos, which inhibits a coordinated response. Moreover, often the political and security pillars—the strongest in terms of influence and financial resources—do not deal with climate-related security issues. As such, if these IGOs remain in their current condition, it is unclear whether their framing and discourse on climate-related security risks will substantially affect the institutional and member state action on these issues. As mentioned, to some extent the sovereignty of states also inhibits the manoeuvrability of these organizations.

**Ways forward**

With the exception of IGAD, this study shows that climate-related security risks present new challenges to regional IGOs. The complexity of these emerging risks and their impact across different security sectors demand

a high degree of coordinated policymaking. To aid this, there is a need for more research to provide a detailed examination of the practical work of regional organizations. Such research would form experiences of working across silos and the challenges to implementing policy frameworks.

Because climate-related security risks are regionally bound, regional organizations are critical actors that must be equipped to deal with them. Regional IGOs can thereby facilitate policy responses that are anchored within the local political and social context. To that end, there is a need to support and provide funding for regional, comprehensive risk assessments that situate a region's vulnerability to climate impacts within local, social, political and economic contexts.

Moreover, there is a need for regional IGOs to develop internal coordination mechanisms that are able to direct policy action across institutional boundaries. The example of the way the Lake Chad crisis has been dealt with by ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States shows the difficulty of managing a crisis that extends across the borders of two regional organizations. Inevitably, climate-related security risks stretch beyond the boundaries of IGOs. Thus, regions could increase their ability to respond to climate-related security risks by developing a coherent governance structure that is based on a subsidiarity principle: if a regional IGO is unable to adequately address climate risks, the next appropriate level of governance should fulfil its subsidiarity function and aid the regional organization.

*The complexity of these emerging risks and their impact across different security sectors demand a high degree of coordinated policymaking*

The question remains whether regional IGOs will be able to credibly deliver on something they are currently not designed to do. Structural limitations (division into silos) and the principle of non-intervention are consistent limitations to the ability of regional organizations. Responses to transnational crises, such as the Lake Chad crisis, often remain constrained due to the domestic interests of powerful actors, hindering the application of the subsidiarity principle already at the national level. In the face of the transnational and multidimensional nature of climate-related security risks, future research should therefore reconsider the current institutional architecture for these kinds of problems and bring forward credible and innovative alternatives that might be better suited to facilitate regional and more local initiatives.

## Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| ACCI | ASEAN Climate Change Initiative |
| ADB | Asian Development Bank |
| AEC | ASEAN Economic Community Council |
| APSC | ASEAN Political-Security Community Council |
| ASCC | ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council |
| ASEAN | Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
| CAADP | Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme |
| CEWARN | Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| EU | European Union |
| ICPAC | IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre |
| IDDRSI | IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| IGOs | intergovernmental organizations |
| LDCF | Least Developed Countries Fund |
| NAIPs | National Agricultural Investment programmes |
| NAPAs | National Adaptation Programmes of Action |
| RAIP | Regional Agricultural Investment Plan |
| REDD+ | Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation |
| SAARC | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation |
| SADKN | South Asia Disaster Knowledge Network |
| SDMC | SAARC Disaster Management Centre |
| UNFCCC | UN Framework Convention on Climate Change |
| UNISDR | UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction |

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# RESPONSES TO CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ASIA AND AFRICA

FLORIAN KRAMPE, ROBERTA SCASSA AND GIOVANNI MITROTTA

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