



International Organization for Migration (IOM)
The UN Migration Agency

ENABLING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF MI- GRATION FLOWS (AND ITS ROOT-CAUSES) FROM SOMALIA TOWARDS EUROPE

DESK-REVIEW REPORT

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Enabling a better understanding of migration flows and its root causes from Somalia towards Europe

This desk review report is part of the outputs of the first phase of IOM's project implementation on data collection to enable a better understanding of migration flows from Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Somalia towards Europe, a collaborative effort by the DTM support team and relevant IOM field missions. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of IOM or its Member States. The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the work do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the last years migration movements from Africa to Europe have gained increased and extensive attention. Through popular discourse and media coverage, a certain image of African migrants has been created, based on three main assumptions: migration from the African continent is steadily increasing, it is mainly directed towards Europe, and its main drivers are poverty, lack of opportunities, and general violence. Images depicted in public often show only the most spectacular movements of a migrant's journey and therewith tend to reinforce the public perception of African migrants as 'desperate invaders' or 'poor victims of smuggling networks' (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014; Schapendonk, 2012).

The main problem with those depictions is, that most of them are based on assumptions, selective cases or individuals' impressions instead of sound empirical evidence. Research and empirical studies on the movements of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have increased in recent years and have highlighted the diversity of migration from those countries, namely the fact that Europe is not the only destination. Nevertheless, the patterns of movements, migrant profiles as well as reasons and experiences of the journey still often lack evidence-based research (De Haas & Flahaux, 2016).

Therefore, this study, rolled out by DTM with support from various IOM country offices, aims to collect data to foster a better understanding of migration movements from Somalia to Europe. A comprehensive understanding of factors shaping migrants' decisions to leave their country, and to choose a particular route and destination can help to inform the debate on regular, irregular and forced migration. It enables policy makers to better target interventions that address humanitarian needs and to mitigate root causes of mobility, particularly for forced migration. In order to better understand the dynamics and characteristics of mobility in particular, IOM will implement surveys in a number of countries and will support efforts to foster a better understanding of how different factors come together in prompting a final decision to migrate, and how this may vary among different socio-demographic profiles of the mobile population. In order to understand which fields are understudied and might need greater attention in evidence-based research this phase of the project aims at establishing existing research gaps and at giving recommendations for further research.

The study revolves around six main thematic areas:

| TA 1 | TA 2 | TA 3 | TA 4 | TA 5 | TA 6 |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Migrant profiles (socio-demographic) | Migration drivers and decision making | Vulnerability factors in origin, transit and destination countries | Role of intermediaries | Migrants' perceptions towards Europe | Migration choices and options |

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGY

2.1 RAPID EVIDENCE ASSESSMENT

The increasing emigration from Western and Eastern African countries towards other parts of the world over the last decades has been reflected in a corresponding abundance of literature on the topic. Focussing in particular on Europe as final destination, especially the more recent literature becomes of value as organizations and scholars have started to show a growing interest in understanding the dynamics of these population movements. To get a better understanding on the literature - what information is available and what is missing, this desk review report uses the Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) as a method to gather as well as to evaluate existing literature on the flows and their root-causes of Somali migrants towards Europe. As outlined in the introduction, the research focusses in particular on six main thematic areas. A preliminary literature review suggests that some of these thematic areas are relatively well covered, while others lack firmer empirical footing. Furthermore, the combination of the different thematic areas, targeting different sample populations within one study adds to the distinctive features of this research study. The REA is therefore believed to be a useful approach for the first phase of the project, evaluating the existing literature, taking into account the clearly defined research questions of the study and for identifying existing data gaps. The REA follows a clear protocol – clear research questions have to be identified and the literature search has to be structured, following a clear pattern and rationale. Furthermore, indicators for the quality and relevance of the source have to be established.

Table 1 - Structure of REA

| | |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Search | IOM internal data (i.e. AVRR data, FMS ¹ etc.) External data, i.e. databases (Google; Google Scholars), journals, organization & government websites Storing search strings |
| File & Coding | Assess type, design of study Screen Quality & Relevance against inclusion criteria Create Excel Spreadsheet Identify relevant thematic area |
| Literature Compilation | Reading and analysis of studies/data Writing phase Identifying research gaps |
| Review | Review of report by relevant stakeholders at headquarter, missions & donor Including feedback and finalizing report |

¹ Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) and Flow Monitoring Survey (FMS)

2.1.1 Data Gathering

In the first phase, “search” data was collected using Google, Google Scholar as well as the search function of organization and government websites. The collection of the data was guided by the “search strings” listed below in Table 2. However, while the use of search strings is helpful to get a first impression on what is available about a specific topic as well as necessary to retrieve relevant data, it is sometimes also described as rigid, as it restricts the search to predefined strings. For this reason, the desk review report also made use of “snowballing” within the literature. Studies, reports and journals of renowned scholars as well as of established organizations on the different thematic areas were screened for their used references on the topic. Those sources were then screened based on the same criteria as the initial sources. The literature was reviewed in accordance with the ten research questions identified for this study. While sources were usually only considered if they dated no older than ten years, older sources providing relevant information, e.g. on historical or theoretical context were also included. All sources were then screened for their quality and relevance to the research study.

Table 2 - Search Strings for Literature Review

| 1. Migrant profiles | 2. Drivers of migration and decision making |
|--|--|
| Somali migrants (refugees; asylum seekers) to (in) Europe | Destination choice migration Europe for Somali |
| Demographic profile Somali migrants | Transit countries destination choice Europe for Somalis |
| Socioeconomic profile Somali migrant | Economic conditions/ migration/ Somalia |
| Somali migrant ethnic/religious persecution/discrimination | Conditions destination country host country migration choice |
| (Unaccompanied) minors Somali (+transit countries e.g, Libya, Sudan etc.) | Drivers of migration push pull Somali Europe |
| Somali migrants/refugees profiles/profiling/arrivals | Migration motivations decision making factors Somali to Europe/ EU |
| | Somali motives for migration |
| 3. Vulnerability factors in origin, transit and destination countries | 4. Role of intermediaries |
| Migrants abuse/exploitation/border guards/sexual abuse/rape/transit/Europe /Libya/ Somalia | Smugglers Europe EU Somalia |
| Europe camp conditions hot spots | Smugglers/Traffickers in Somalia/ Libya/Sudan |
| Europe stranded migrants | Smuggler destination choice |
| Turkey/Libya migrants asylum seekers returned deported | Smuggler abuse exploitation Europe Somali |
| Refugee/asylum seeker women/children Europe/EU | Smuggler protection network ethnic |

| | |
|--|---|
| Unaccompanied (minor/children) shelter asylum seeker protection risk | Smuggler/trafficker network Somalia/Libya/ Sudan/Europe |
| Detention migrant asylum seeker | |
| 5. Migrants' perceptions towards Europe | 6. Migration Options |
| Migrant perception/misinformation about Europe | Legal/regular vs. illegal/irregular migration from Somalia towards Europe |
| Migrant knowledge asylum procedures policy Europe | Legal channels for Somali migrants to Europe/EU |
| Expectations reality migrant perceptions Europe | Migration choices for Somali migrants |
| Migration information campaigns | |

2.1.2 Screening of Sources for Relevance

As previously mentioned in order to identify a source as relevant it is screened against the nine established research questions:

- 1) Does the source provide information on the contextual factors on a **national and regional level** which drive Somali nationals to make a decision to migrate to Europe?
- 2) Does the source provide information on the contextual factors on the **European level** which drive Somali nationals to make a decision to migrate to Europe?
- 3) Does the source provide information on particular **individual, household or community level "events"** and circumstances that **trigger** Somali nationals to make a **decision to migrate** to Europe?
- 4) Does the source provide information on the **socio-demographic profiles** of (potential) migrants to Europe from Somalia?
- 5) Does the source provide information on how migrants from Somalia **prepare for migration** to Europe?
- 6) Does the source provide information on **the role of "intermediaries"** in **facilitating (irregular) migration** to Europe for Somali nationals?
- 7) Does the source provide information on the **challenges and vulnerabilities** Somali nationals face **before and during migration** to Europe?
- 8) Does the source provide information on how migrants from Somalia select a **final destination country in Europe**? If yes, what **influences this decision** and why is the particular destination country selected?
- 9) Does the source provide information on the **perceptions/ knowledge** migrants from Somalia have on **potential risks & vulnerabilities** migrants could face during migration to/ in Europe?
- 10) Does the source provide information on the **perceptions and/or knowledge** (potential) migrants from Somalia have of Europe and what their **sources of information** are? What is the **view** of Somali (irregular) migrants **on socio-economic opportunities in Europe** and what knowledge do they have of European asylum procedures?

When screening for the relevance of the sources, the criteria outlined in Table 3 were applied. Apart from these criteria, the publication date of the source also played a role in certain cases. Even though the review was only intended to include studies from the last 10 years, the date often mattered depending on the topic of interest. Therefore, the date was sometimes reflected in the relevance score.

Table 3 - Assessing Relevance of Source

| | |
|---|--|
| 1 | The data may contribute towards answering the question but is limited, incomplete or represents only a minor focus of the report |
| 2 | A significant proportion of the data is directly relevant to answering the question |
| 3 | Data has been gathered and analysed to specifically address the questions posed |

2.1.3 Screening of Source for Quality

In addition to their relevance, sources were also assessed for their quality. The desk review report distinguishes in its evaluation between primary² and secondary³ studies, which were assessed according to different criteria. The quality of primary studies were evaluated based on the following criteria, and given a score from zero to six:

Table 4 - Assessing Quality of Primary Studies⁴

| | |
|--|-------------|
| Does the study have a conceptual framework and clear research question? | 1 Yes/ 0 No |
| Does the study appear to draw conclusions based on its results rather than theory or policy? | 1 Yes/ 0 No |
| Does the study explain its research design and data collection methods? | 1 Yes/ 0 No |
| Does the study present or link to data sources? | 1 Yes/ 0 No |
| Is the study internally valid? Are alternative causes of impact or the study’s limitations considered? | 1 Yes/ 0 No |
| Is the study externally valid? Can findings be generalised to other contexts and populations? | 1 Yes/ 0 No |

Secondary studies were assessed according to slightly different criteria, and given a score between zero and three:

² Primary research involves collecting data about a given subject directly or using the raw data to draw analysis or conclusions e.g. empirical journals (both qualitative and quantitative - in form of interviews, surveys, observations, censuses etc.)
³ Secondary research involves analyzing and interpreting of primary research. The method of writing secondary research is to collect primary research that is relevant to a writing topic and interpret what the primary research found (i.e. literature reviews, country profiles, newspaper articles etc.)
⁴ The initial criteria were taken from the study by Cummings, C., Pacitto, J., Lauro, D. & Foresti, M. (2015) but amended to the requirements of this desk-review report

Table 5 – Assessing Quality of Secondary Studies³

| | |
|--|--------------------|
| Does the study describe where and how studies/data were selected for inclusion? | 1 Yes/ 0 No |
| Does the study assess the quality of the studies/data included? | 1 Yes/ 0 No |
| Does the study draw conclusions based on the studies/data reviewed and consider alternative conclusions and/or limitations to the conclusions? | 1 Yes/ 0 No |

In total, more than 100 articles, studies, papers, and reports were reviewed and 57 articles were included in this literature review, based on their relevance to the Somali and Horn of Africa regional context. All scores allocated to the sources were entered into an Excel spreadsheet.

Table 6 below shows the total number of sources used per thematic area as well as the average relevance and quality scores of sources.⁵

Table 6 - Overview of Sources per Thematic Area

| Thematic Area | Number of sources used | Average Relevance | Average Quality (Primary Data) | Average Quality (Secondary Data) |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <i>History/Current Trends</i> | 11 | 2.4 | 4.25 | 2.3 |
| <i>Profile</i> | 10 | 2.5 | 4.75 | 2.5 |
| <i>Decision-Making</i> | 18 | 2.1 | 4.4 | 2.2 |
| <i>Vulnerabilities</i> | 14 | 2.4 | 4.8 | 2.3 |
| <i>Intermediaries</i> | 7 | 2.5 | 4.4 | 2.2 |
| <i>Perceptions</i> | 4 | 1.8 | 5 | 1.3 |
| <i>Migration Options</i> | 7 | 2.2 | 4.5 | 2.5 |

³ The initial criteria were taken from the study by Cummings, C., Pacitto, J., Lauro, D. & Foresti, M. (2015) but amended to fit the requirements of this desk-review report

⁵ This list does not include sources that are primarily data compilations, such as data from Eurostat, Frontex etc.

3. PAST AND CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION PATTERNS

3.1 MIGRATION WITHIN AND FROM SOMALIA

In order to better understand contemporary migration patterns and routes, the report will provide a brief overview of general country facts about Somalia as well as summarize main migration trends during the last century before moving on to current trends while looking at the different thematic areas.

3.1.1 Basic Country Facts on Somalia

Somalia is located in East Africa and part of the region referred to as the Horn of Africa, bordering Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya (UN-Data, 2016; CIA, 2017). As of 2016, it counted a total of 10.8 million inhabitants. Somalia is officially divided into 18 administrative divisions or regions, each known as *gobol* with Mogadishu as its capital. Somalia as a country is de facto divided into three distinct administrative areas: Somaliland (a self-declared independent state, however not recognised by the international community), Puntland (a self-declared autonomous state of Somalia), and Southern and Central Somalia reaching from south of Puntland, from Mudug region to the south.

Somalia is one of the most ethnically and culturally homogenous countries in Sub-Saharan Africa: 85 percent of its population are of Somali origin and share the same language, religion (Sunni Muslim) and culture. Yet despite this apparent homogeneity, clan affiliations are a deep and divisive component of cultural identity (EASO, 2014; Avis & Hebert, 2016; IOM, 2014; Lindley, 2013). The political constitution of Somali society lies in kinship and social contacts, in which the kinship structure is based on a patrilineal, lineage type – known as clans. The major principal clans in the country are the Hawiye, Darood, Dir/Isaaq, and Rahanweyn (Digil and Mirifle) clans (ACCORD, 2009).

Poverty is widespread and persistent across Somalia – using a poverty line of USD 2 per day, almost three quarters of the total population (73%) are considered poor. Of those three quarters that are considered poor, 60 per cent of the urban population and 80 per cent of the rural population are affected. The country also ranks at the bottom of many human development indicators, including level of education, health, and gender equality.

Somalia and its migration patterns are both shaped by conflict and environmental hazards such as droughts and regular floods (IOM, 2014). Somalia ranks highly as a source country for people in mixed migration flows, within the Horn of Africa as well as Europe and North America, consisting primarily of asylum seekers and refugees (more than one million) (RMMS, 2016a). As a result, Somalia has one of

the largest and most widespread diaspora community, contributing large amounts of remittances every year to Somalia's economy.

3.1.2 Past Migration Trends in Somalia

In 1960 Somalia gained independence from Great Britain (Somaliland from Italy)⁶ and established a multiparty system driven by clan structures. Only nine years after the country's establishment, Major-General Mohammed Siad Barre led a military coup and established the Somali Democratic Republic. The first phase of Somalia's protracted conflict began as a liberation movement (1987-1991), between the government and the Somali National Movement in north-western Somalia (Somaliland). The conflict turned into clan-based civil warfare in 1991, when armed opposition groups overthrew the autocratic military regime. In the years following the ouster of the military regime, various factions vied for control in Somalia, which was largely left without a central government. The Transitional National Government (TNG) commanded little internal support, failed to implement vital reforms and made little progress. As a result, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a coalition of Sharia courts and warlords (amongst others Al-Shabaab), successfully challenged the TNG and took control of the southern parts of the country, restoring some level of order. By 2009 Al-Shabaab, a group linked with the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, became Somalia's most powerful insurgent group. A series of offensives led by the Somali military, bolstered by an intervention of the Kenyan army in 2011, succeeded in weakening Al-Shabaab. With growing stability in Southern and Central Somalia and its capital Mogadishu, in 2012, the country held its first indirect election in 40 years (IOM, 2014).

The civil war culminated in the collapse of the state and the breakup of state institutions. Somalia was declared a "fragile state" and is considered one of the longest-running instances of state collapse in post-colonial history (Menkhaus, 2007; ICG, 2008). The war led to the displacement of more than 500,000 Somali refugees, living in eight refugee camps in Ethiopia, as well as hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Before the civil war in 1991, international migration from Somalia consisted predominantly of a small number of sea-men who settled in the United Kingdom (UK) and students and professionals settling in diverse places, due to colonial ties. Unsatisfied with the military regime as well as for work in the 1970s and 1980s, larger numbers of Somali nationals moved to the Gulf States (Lindley, 2009). The first major wave of migration was recorded during the Ethio-Somali war (1977–1978), when a million Ethiopian

⁶ Starting in the 1880s Great Britain, France and Italy competed for territories across Africa, including Somalia. This contest was also known as the Scramble for Africa. Until its independence in 1960, the territory encompassing present-day Somalia and Djibouti changed hands several times and was ruled by all three colonial powers. Somalia, parts of which had been under Italian rule until World War II, was under British rule when it became independent in 1960, while the Italian ruled over Somaliland, which became independent in 1977, Djibouti was ruled by the French (Lewis, 2003).

refugees fled to Somalia. After the war, the majority returned to Ethiopia. The 1991 civil war also triggered a large movement of people. Between 1987 and 1991 around 500,000 Somali refugees were displaced to Ethiopian camps and 100,000 Somalis became internally displaced. As a result of the enduring violence, another 500,000 Somali refugees fled to Ethiopia and Djibouti in 1991–1992. In 2011, the combination of prolonged drought, famine, conflict and governance vacuum displaced 297,000 Somali refugees to Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Yemen (IOM, 2014; Avis & Hebert, 2016).

Migration in Somalia is not a new phenomenon: in the early twentieth century, Somali seafarers who worked on colonial ships settled and formed communities in port cities in Western European countries, such as the United Kingdom and Norway (Elmi, 2010; RMMS, 2016a). Nonetheless, the largest share of migration from Somalia has occurred in the past 25 years, as a result of conflict, chronic insecurity, extreme poverty, famine, and the absence of an effective central government (RMMS, 2016a).

3.1.3 Contemporary Migration Trends in Somalia

As a result of emigration and the large-scale displacements of the past decades, about 18 per cent of Somalia's population – (close to 2 million Somalis) currently live abroad as part of the global diaspora. The main destination countries for Somali refugees and asylum seekers are Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen. In June 2016, 976,574 Somali refugees were displaced in the Horn of Africa and in Yemen, the majority in Kenya (43%) Yemen (26%) and Ethiopia (26%). A smaller, but still considerable, number of Somali nationals migrated to countries in the Middle East, North America and Europe to join already existing community structures (Elmi, 2010; IOM, 2014). Since 2015 a growing number of migrants from the Horn of Africa, including a large share of Somalis, have been reaching Europe's borders (Reitano, Tinti, Shaw, & Bird, 2017).

While large numbers of Somali nationals fled to other countries, many were also displaced internally. Internal displacement has mainly affected the Southern and Central regions of Somalia, where it is attributed to a number of factors, including forced evictions, drought and food insecurity, abuses by Al-Shabaab militants and tribal clashes. Border disputes between Puntland and Somaliland have also contributed to displacement in both zones (RMMS, 2016a). According to UNHCR there were approximately 1.1 million IDPs across Somalia (893,000 in Southern and Central, 130,000 in Puntland and 85,000 in Somaliland) in 2015. That number reached over 2 million in 2017, according to the latest DTM Somalia estimates (see Figure 7). The statistics show that out of the 10.8 million residents of Somalia, over 18 per cent are either refugees and asylum seekers or IDPs (Avis & Hebert, 2016).

Table 7 - Somalia Migration Statistics

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Stock of emigrants (2015) ^a | 1,998,764 |
| To developed Regions | 459,164 |
| To developing Regions | 1,539,600 |
| Within Africa | 1,276,600 |
| Within Eastern African Region | 1,058,550 |
| To Asia | 262,944 |
| To Europe | 279,948 |
| To Northern America | 170,326 |
| To other parts | 8,946 |
| Refugee population 2016 (incl. refugee-like situations) ^b | 1,012,277 |
| Asylum seeker population 2016 ^b | 60,412 |
| Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 2017 ^b | 2,100,000 |

^aUNDESA, International Migrant Stock 2015 ^bIOM Somalia DTM. Round 6 Summary Rounded Estimate 2017

Migration trends from Somalia are identified as “being unlikely to change in the short as well as medium term”. Migration from the country is driven mainly but not exclusively by limited employment and livelihood opportunities, conflict, the suppression of political, economic and social rights as well as climatic events. Somalia continues to be considered one of the world’s most violent countries. Communal conflicts are common in Somaliland and Puntland, with Al-Shabaab operating primarily in southern Somalia (Avis & Hebert, 2016).

4. THEMATIC AREAS

4.1 THEMATIC AREA I – MIGRANTS’ PROFILES

Before investigating in more depth, the movements of migrants towards Europe this report aims to establish a general profile of Somali migrants. In order to do so, the report takes literature into account that analyses the profiles of Somali migrants who leave their home country. As a complementary method, DTM Flow Monitoring Surveys (FMS), which are collected in various countries around the globe are used in order to generate a more complete picture of migrant profile including data on migrants en route.

This research does not distinguish between the different migrants’ classifications but focusses on mixed migration as a whole. Therefore, when establishing the profiles of Ethiopian nationals migrating to Europe all migrant groups are taken into account.

4.1.1 Profile of Somali Nationals leaving their Home-Country

Overall, the gender distribution of all migrants leaving Somali appears to be fairly balanced: 54% of Somali migrants are male, while 46% are female. The distribution of Somali migrants in Yemen, however, is severely skewed: 80 per cent of Somali migrants in Yemen are male (IOM, 2014). Majidi (2016) also notes that Somalis arriving in Europe are predominately male and between 15 and 24 years of age. This observation is supported by a study conducted by Altai Consulting in 2016, which reported that the typical Somali migrant is under 25 years old (Vever, Le Coz, Malakooti, & Dillais, 2016). According to UNHCR (2015b), around 10 percent of Somalis arriving irregularly in Italy in 2015 were unaccompanied and separated children (UASCs) (Avis & Hebert, 2016).

While all regions of Somalia witnesses emigration, the largest share of emigrants appear to originate from South and Central Somalia. In a study by Vever, Malakooti et al. (2016), interviewing potential migrants in three Somali cities, the largest share of those that aspired to migrate came from the capital, Mogadishu (47%), while 35 per cent were from Kismayo and 15 per cent from Baidoa. According to a 2013 study carried out amongst Somali migrants in Yemen, most migrants originated from Mogadishu, Merka, Bossaso, Galkacyo, Hiiraan, Borama, Wanla Weyn, Awdal and Hargeysa and were predominantly affiliated with the clans of Hawiye, Digil/Mirifle, Darood, Isaaq and Dir (RMMS 2014, in Avis & Hebert, 2016).

In terms of education levels, while Somali nationals who emigrated in the 1980s and 1990s were predominately highly skilled and educated, current migration flows feature every level of education. Nonetheless, a study by Vever, Malakooti et al. (2016) reports that the typical aspiring migrant has an intermediary/middle-level education – neither those with the lowest education level nor those with the highest education level expressed aspirations to migrate. These findings support the theory according to which established inequality is more influential than absolute needs. This theory assumes that other than poverty itself, a perception of inequality, or the fact that others are better off than oneself, is an additional factor impacting an individual's decision to migrate. Because the poorest often do not have a direct point of reference, they have lesser aspirations to migrate both because they lack the necessary capital and because they do not have a perception of inequality. Social groups with the highest aspiration to migrate are students (41%) and the unemployed (28%), since both groups have a reference point to which they compare themselves, engendering a perception of inequality and fostering their desire to migrate (Avis & Hebert, 2016; Vever, Le Coz, Malakooti, & Dillais, 2016).

Feminization of Migration

The term 'feminization of migration' points to the fact that women are increasingly becoming active participants in the process of migration. Nowadays, women make up almost half of all international

migrants. Furthermore, women’s reasons for migration have changed over time, as it is now recognized that more and more women are independently deciding to become active in the global labour market. Unfortunately, even though the trend is going towards more independence for women in the migration process, long-established and exploitative female-specific forms of migration persist, including trafficking of women for sexual exploitation, the commercialization of domestic workers, as well as the organization of women for marriage (Carling, 2005; Kuschminder, Andersson, & Siegel, 2012).


In the case of Somalia, migration has significantly changed the compositions of Somali households. Households were traditionally led by a male member (either the husband or the father) and were part of a larger clan structure. With more females and children migrating, whether with their family or by themselves, traditional structures and cultures have evolved and customary social norms have weakened, allowing many women to take a more active social and economic role and to adopt a new status, both in their families in the host countries and back home in Somalia (Jinnah, 2013).


4.1.2 Profile of Somali Nationals in Transit

Eastern and Central Europe

DTM carried out Flow Monitoring Surveys (FMS) along the Eastern and Central Mediterranean routes. In the DTM FMS dataset of 2016, 52 Somali migrants were surveyed along the Eastern Mediterranean route, 35 (69%) of which were located in Greece, 15 (29%) in Hungary and one in Serbia.

As research in the later part will show – the Central Mediterranean route is the most commonly route used by Somali migrants to reach Europe with Italy being the main point of entry. 68% of the 231 Somali migrants captured in the FMS data of 2016, in Italy, were male and the majority (68%) was aged 18 to 29, although a large share (26%) were minors, aged 14 to 17 years old. Only 6 percent were 30 years or older, and the oldest surveyed Somali migrant was 49 years old. In terms of education, half of the surveyed Somali nationals had completed secondary education, 31 per cent completed primary education, and only 4 per cent reported to have no form of education.





The dataset shows that the majority of Somali migrants are single (72%). However, when comparing the marital statuses by gender it appears that Somali women in transit are more likely to be married than men (31% versus 22%).

4.1.3 Profile of Somali Nationals in Europe

Eurostat data show that 21,815 Somali nationals applied for asylum in Europe in the year of 2016. As shown in Table 8 below, almost half (47%) of asylum applications made by Somalis in Europe were lodged in Germany.

Table 8 – Number of asylum applications made by Somali nationals in Europe in 2016, by country

| Country | Total number of Somali asylum applications |
|--------------|--|
| Germany | 10,230 |
| Italy | 2,390 |
| Sweden | 1,670 |
| Switzerland | 1,580 |
| Austria | 1,535 |
| France | 885 |
| Other | 3,525 |
| Total | 21,815 |

Data suggests that Somali migrants in Europe are predominantly male, as indicated by the gender distribution of Somali asylum seekers, 65 per cent of whom are male and 35 per cent of whom are female. The age distribution of asylum applicants shows that 60 per cent of the Somali applicants are between the age of 18 and 34, while 34 per cent are under 18 years old and only 10 percent are 35 and older (Eurostat, 2017).

THEMATIC AREA I – DATA GAPS

Information and literature on the profiles of Somali nationals that left their home-country to Europe has grown considerably in the past few years. A number of quantitative studies have been developed or are currently implemented in order to gain a better understanding of the general profiles of Somali migrants that are en-route towards Europe, such as DTM's Flow Monitoring Surveys (FMS) throughout the Mediterranean and North Africa. Continued (in-depth) quantitative data collection on socio-economic profiles of Somali nationals that migrate to Europe could increase the knowledge base on the socio-economic background of potential and recently arrived Ethiopian migrants in Europe.

4.2 THEMATIC AREA 2 – DRIVERS OF MIGRATION AND THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Understanding the historical patterns and profiles of Somali migrants from the previous sections allows to get a better picture of the factors that drive Somali migrants to leave their place of origin and start their journey to Europe. This section explores the drivers leading Somali nationals to decide to migrate, and summarizes existing data on the decision-making process and the role external factors in this process.

While much of the literature on Somalia focuses on the decision-making process at the macro-and meso-level, research at the micro level remains scarce. De Haas (2011) suggests that analysing the decision-making processes and drivers of migration at the micro-level and incorporating factors such as aspirations and skills in the analysis would provide a more complete picture of migration from Somalia. De Haas (2008) also highlights the fact that migration of relatively well-off households is a conscious choice perceived as a mean to enhance their livelihood (Collyer, 2006; De Haas, 2008).

4.2.1 Reasons for leaving Somalia

Somalia is a major country of origin for migration flows within the Horn of Africa, to neighbouring Yemen, and to Europe. A consensus within the literature observes that the largest outflows from Somalia occurred in the last 25 years, triggered by conflict, persisting insecurity, extreme poverty, famine as well as the lack of an effective central government (RMMS, 2016b). Majidi (2016) suggests that there are insufficiently recognized drivers of migration from Somalia since the country has been identified as "post-conflict", i.e. a country in which open warfare has come to an end. However, although according

to definition there is an absence of war in a post-conflict situation, this does not mean that peace prevails and the international community is dismissed from its obligation (Brahimi, 2007). In the case of Somalia (although supposedly identified as post-conflict) the country remains especially fragile due to challenges in humanitarian conditions, a fragile food security situation, and a precarious security environment. Many aspects of Somalia's traditional mobility patterns are assumed to have been irrevocably altered in the aftermath of the crisis due to resource degradation, property loss and from the sociocultural impacts of generations having lived, born or grown-up in crowded settlements. All of these factors intertwine and their evolution will undoubtedly influence future migration trends, opportunities, and decisions to return to Somalia (IOM, 2014).

Conflict and clan-based warfare

Somalia is considered one of the most fragile states in the world, witnessing civil war and the deficiency of its central government. The country's conflict and fragility are fuelled by factors such as clannism, resource scarcity, poor governance, militarization and regional disputes. Somalia is one of the countries with one of the highest numbers of recorded violent incidents, making it one of the most violent countries in the world. The presence of groups such as Al-Shabaab in Southern and Central Somalia, which control parts of the territory and perpetrate persistent attacks in these areas, are at the core of this violence (Council on foreign Relations, 2017). Clans are considered a source of both conflict and stability. In case of insurgences they can form alliances for protection, access to water or political power. On the other hand, clan affiliation, which is a greater contributor of identity for many Somalis than their attachment to the country of Somalia, can also lead to conflict. Multiple actors, including clans, political militias and external military forces, have used forced displacement as a tactic of warfare (Avis & Hebert, 2016).

Human rights and political inefficiency

Freedom House (2016) identified Somalia as "not free"⁷ with regard to civil and political rights of its citizens as well as of the media. Journalists in Somalia are often subject to harassment, intimidations, and arbitrary killings. The country is on the third lowest rank, out of the 50 least free countries. The federal government of Somalia does not control all parts of the country, and civilians suffer from many conflict-related abuses, mostly in the areas controlled by armed groups such as Al-Shabaab. Other violations of human rights include arbitrary and politically motivated arrest, denials of fair trials, corruption, human trafficking, discriminations against minorities, forced reallocations of IDPs as well as GBV and social stigmatisation of LGBT individuals (Avis & Hebert, 2016).

⁷ The identification of "not free" is based on clearly defined criteria and a point system by the Freedom House taking into account the countries situation of political rights as well as civil liberties. The full methodology is accessible here: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2016/methodology>

Gender based violence

Women and girls face particular challenges in Somalia, since gender based violence (GBV), including rape, child marriage and female genital mutilation (FGM) are common practices in the country. According to UNICEF, these practices are not considered violations in the Somali culture, which does not recognize the rights of women. FGM is considered to be a social convention, and girls face pressure from both family and friends to undergo FGM, as it is often linked to virginity, fidelity and dowries (UNDP, 2012; Avis & Hebert, 2016). As the traditional 'xeer' and Sharia law progressively replaced the federal political and judicial systems during the civil war, women were excluded from customary political and judicial structures, and were notably denied property and inheritance rights. GBV against Somali women, including rape and domestic violence, is prevalent across all social and economic strata, and is not discussed openly in Somali society (IOM, 2014).

Economic conditions and livelihood opportunities

The economic and livelihood situation of Somalis cannot be assessed on its own, and must be looked at in combination with other factors. Economic migration is most often considered to be of voluntary nature. However, this characterization is not as easily made in the Somali migration context, where economic migration is often a coping strategy to the enduring conflict and is considered by some as forced migration (UNDP, 2012; IOM, 2014). Somalia has one of the highest youth unemployment rate, with 67 per cent of Somalis in the 14 to 29 years-old range without a job (UNDP, 2012). With 70 per cent of Somalia's population no older than 30 years-old, the unemployment rate is especially worrisome. According to Samuel Hall (2015), insufficient economic growth is a fundamental barrier to tackling youth underemployment and unemployment. The lack of adequate skills in Somalia's labour markets is also considered a major hindrance to economic growth (Avis & Hebert, 2016).

Environmental conditions

The combination of a severe draught and ongoing conflicts in the south of the country led to four million people being at risk of starvation and another two million facing food insecurity, prompting the UN to refer to Somalia's situation as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Regular flooding also compounded the problem (IOM, 2014). Although the crisis supposedly ended by the end of 2011, a large part of the country still cannot meet essential food needs. Predominantly caused by the El Niño weather pattern, the country experiences climate change and demographic pressure on natural resources, accelerating the destruction of environmental assets. The situation is made worse by the absence of an institutional framework for environmental protection and water resource management (Avis & Hebert, 2016). Since more than 50 per cent of the population are either pastoralists or agro-pastoralists, deriving food and income from rearing livestock, the prevailing ecological conditions are critical to the rural

activities and livelihoods. This makes livestock rearing and crop production key components of the livelihoods of the majority of Somali nationals. Lindley (2014) also stresses in her study that environmental challenges and conflicts are interrelated: droughts can lead to a scarcity of resources, leading to violent conflict, or vice versa – conflict and insecurity may aggravate environmental problems such as droughts.

4.2.2 Decision-making factors

According to the literature, the decision to leave and the choice of the destination country depend on three criteria: the cost of the journey, the potential threats and challenges encountered during the journey, and the objective and expected duration of migration. The findings of a study on youth employment and migration by Vever, Malakooti and Dillais (2016) suggest that ‘push factors’ are assumed to be more influential in the decision to migrate than ‘pull factors’⁸. This explains why the costs of migration and the risks faced along the journey do not appear to be a decisive obstacle in the decision to migrate, although the costs of the journey and the stories of failed migration of fellow Somalis do discourage some of them. The study also notes that migrants often take a long time before deciding to migrate, often only making that decision when they reached a so-called “tipping point”, at which the migrants feel like they have exhausted all options at home and have no possibility but to leave their country and try their luck abroad (Vever, Le Coz, Malakooti, & Dillais, 2016)

Migration as a household strategy

In Somalia, the decision to migrate is often not made by the individual alone but is generally made in consultation with the whole family. Migration from Somalia is often linked to some form of household strategy, and the decision to migrate may be prompted by the need to diversify the family’s settlement patterns in order to minimize risks and maximize opportunities for the whole entity. A household sends a household member abroad, usually to an industrialized country, with the expectation that the migrant abroad will support the family back home by sending money through the form of remittances. While these household strategies can be beneficial, the solidarity links can also lead to dependency and breed negativity as a result of unfulfilled expectations. The expectations of a family that sends one of its members to an industrialized country, often puts a lot of pressure on the individual. These expectations often remain unfulfilled, as many migrants face unemployment or low-income jobs in their host countries (Moret, 2006).

⁸ *Push factors* are factors that compel a person, due to different reasons, to leave that place and go to some other place, e.g. low productivity, unemployment and underdevelopment, poor economic conditions, lack of opportunities for advancement, exhaustion of natural resources and natural calamities

Pull factors are factors which attract the migrants to an area, e.g. opportunities for better employment, higher wages, facilities, better working conditions and attractive amenities are pull factors of an area (Thet, 2014)

4.2.3 The diaspora's role in decision-making and acting as a driver for migration

Around 18 per cent of Somalia's population is believed to live outside the country and to be part of the Somali diaspora⁹. Kenya and Yemen have the largest Somali diaspora communities, followed by the UK, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Italy. Somali nationals living in urban areas are assumed to be more likely to have relatives living abroad and benefit from diaspora assistance (Sheikh & Healy, 2009). The diaspora is a major contributor to the economy and stability of Somalia, contributing between USD 1.3 and 2 billion per year in remittances (RMMS, 2016a). According to an IFAD survey¹⁰, 69 per cent of respondents said that they had a relative living abroad, and 65 percent of respondents reported having more than one relative living abroad. Of those respondents with at least one relative living abroad, 85 per cent were receiving remittances, predominantly from Europe and the United States (Orozco & Yansura, 2013). In addition to remittances, diaspora members can also have an impact on the decision to migrate, and are believed to incentivise further migration. This incentive is often rather indirect as diaspora members who return to Somalia are often perceived to get on average better-paying jobs than those that did not migrate, leading many young Somalis to take them as role models (Vever et al, 2016). Social media also plays a big role, as young migrants share their (mainly positive) experiences on Facebook or other platforms, thereby fuelling the aspirations of other young Somalis to leave the country. Social media also allows migrants to remain in contact with family and friends back home, lowering the barriers to migrate (ibid). A study of Somalis in Australia by Haandrikman & Hassanen (2014) found that for all of the respondents surveyed, help from social and transnational networks and the maintenance of close connections with relatives and other acquaintances in the country of destination had been essential in this migration process as well as to cope with daily life abroad.

THEMATIC AREA 2 – DATA GAPS

Literature on macro-level drivers for Somali out-migration is relatively extensive and focusses on reasons such as conflict and clan-based warfare, economic hardship and worsening living conditions, or challenges resulting from deteriorating environmental conditions. Various literature does acknowledge the importance of micro level factors that influence decision making processes for out-migration, unfortunately there is a lack of in-depth research and representative samples that provide more insights regarding micro-level factors that drive out-migration to Europe and influences related migration decision making processes.

⁹ Diasporas are broadly defined as individuals and members or networks, associations and communities, who have left their country of origin but maintain links with their homelands. This concept covers more settled expatriate communities, migrant workers based abroad temporarily, expatriates who are nationals of the host country, dual nationals, and second-/third generation migrants (IOM Glossary, 2nd edition, 2011)

¹⁰ a 2009 survey of remittance recipients in Somalia carried out for the UN International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

4.3 THEMATIC AREA 3 – RISKS AND VULNERABILITIES IN ORIGIN, TRANSIT AND DESTINATION COUNTRIES


Before explaining the different challenges and risks Somali migrants face along their journey towards Europe, the routes will first be explained to get a better understanding of where migrants can potentially encounter risks and vulnerabilities. In the case of Somalia, the main migration route to Europe lead through Ethiopia and Libya before making their way on the Central Mediterranean route from Libya towards Europe (mainly Italy).

While Banulescu-Bogdan & Fratzke (2015) claim that in general, the use of the Central Mediterranean route has diminished, partly due to the increasing instability in Libya, making the Eastern Mediterranean route the primary maritime route in 2015, it has nevertheless been the most commonly used route for migrants from the SSA region. Contrary to what has been suggested in previous literature, migration movements, especially from the SSA-region, are not linear, uninterrupted journeys. Particularly for those moving by land, the journey consist of various sections.

As the MEDMIG study of 2015 showed, the first part of the journey, the East African route, which is mainly used by migrants from the Horn of Africa, is fragmented in nature and includes numerous stops before reaching Libya. The second part of the journey, the Central Mediterranean route, is however more direct as 96 per cent of those who participated in the study that had arrived in Italy in 2015 came from Libya (Crawley, Düvell, Jones, McMahon, & Sigona, 2016; Lutterbeck, et al., 2015).

While the routes differ and cannot always be generalized, this research focuses on the main route chosen by Somali nationals. Still, by doing so, the report does not ignore the existence of other routes but in order to obtain a more comprehensive picture it makes references to these whenever considered relevant.

Map 1- Main routes from Somalia towards Europe



A study funded by

4.3.1 Risks and Vulnerabilities faced in Somalia/ Horn of Africa Region

Routes out of Somalia

The most popular route out of Somalia and towards Europe runs through Ethiopia. An Altai Consulting study in 2013 estimated that between 500 and 3,000 Somali migrants cross the border between Somaliland and Ethiopia every month (RMMS, 2016a). Somali migrants use the “northern route” traveling to Libya and sometimes continuing to Europe by land and sea (Frouws, 2014). This journey goes through Somaliland, Puntland or Djibouti, but then moves through Ethiopia to Sudan and on to Libya and Europe. A significant entry point for Somalis into Ethiopia appears to be the border crossing at Tog Wajaale, connecting Somaliland with Ethiopia (Sahan, 2016; Reitano, Tinti, Shaw, & Bird, 2017). Furthermore, groups of Somali migrants often gather in Hargeysa (Somaliland) and then travel through the border town of Togochale to Ethiopia, transiting Addis Ababa and Gondar town (Reitano, Tinti, Shaw, & Bird, 2017). While these routes appear to be the most popular, amongst the Somali youth (15-25 years) a new emerging trend is to reach Europe by travelling through Yemen onwards to Sudan. This route emerged at the end of 2015 – Somali migrants leave remote coastal towns near Bossaso by sea, arriving in Mukallah, Yemen. From Mukallah onward they make their way overland to Mokha, a coastal town in western Yemen. Once in Mokha, migrants then take another boat to cross the Red Sea and travel to Sudan (RMMS, 2016a).

Air travel

As described in this section, the majority of migrants from the Horn of Africa are believed to travel via land. Still, a part of the migrant population acquires visas (real or forged ones) to fly to Turkey and travel onwards to Greece via boat. As Reitano et al. (2017) describe, “it was observed that many from the Horn of Africa fly into airports and depart on fraudulent documents from Istanbul for onward movement to Europe” (p. 10). Figures on Somali migrants in Greece are relatively rare in comparison to the numbers reported in Italy. Although the number of Somali migrants arriving along the Eastern Mediterranean route is lower, many reports do not take migrants from the Horn of Africa into account at all. However, data compiled by the European Stability Initiative (ESI) based on figures from the Hellenic Police, reports the number of detected irregular Somali nationals in Greece to be around 4,500 in 2015 (ESI, 2017). Furthermore, the 2016/2017 DTM FMS for the Eastern Mediterranean route indicates that around 1.2 per cent (39 individuals) of the 5,703 migrants surveyed in Greece were of Somali origin.

Risks and Vulnerabilities at place of origin

Migrants from the Horn of Africa are exposed to a range of risks throughout their journey to Europe. The section from Somalia to Ethiopia, however, appears to be relatively safe in comparison to other parts. Still, at the beginning of their journey, Somali migrants face the risk of falling into the hands of

the “wrong smugglers” and ending up in trafficking networks. Furthermore, throughout the Horn of Africa migration routes, high levels of violence are evident. Somali migrants have reportedly experienced severe abuse at the hands of smugglers, but also by traffickers to whom they were often sold. There appears to be a significant overlap between smuggling and trafficking groups throughout the region, indicating a blurry line between the two activities (Reitano, Tinti, Shaw, & Bird, 2017). Somali women are known to be trafficked to the Middle East and South Africa as domestic workers and for sexual exploitation. Somali men are mostly trafficked to work as herdsmen or menial workers in the Gulf States while Somali children are often trafficked to countries such as Djibouti and Malawi for sexual exploitation and general work (Frouws, 2014; IOM, 2014; Avis & Hebert, 2016).

4.3.2 Risks and Vulnerabilities faced en route (Ethiopia/Sudan and Libya/Egypt)

Routes through Ethiopia and Sudan

The most commonly used border crossing point from Ethiopia into Sudan are in Metema and Humera in the north of Ethiopia. Another common route chosen by migrants to avoid authorities and check points crosses the province of Wollega and the towns of Gambela or Assosa. The journey to Khartoum in Sudan is estimated to take between three and six days from Addis Ababa. Irregular journeys from Ethiopia to Khartoum through Metema are estimated to cost between USD 50 and USD 200, with the price depending, amongst others, on whether the smugglers are bribing or bypassing authorities (Carter & Rohwerder, 2016; Frouws, 2014). Journeys that are subject to bribes are more expensive but typically also perceived as less dangerous. Smugglers often try to arrange the journeys directly from Eastern Sudan to Libya or Egypt, avoiding to go through Khartoum, moving migrants through the River Nile State either to the Red Sea State or to the city of Dongola in the north, bordering both Egypt and Libya (Reitano, Tinti, Shaw, & Bird, 2017).

Routes through Libya and Egypt, heading to Europe

The majority of Somali migrants reach Europe (Italy and in some cases Malta) by the Central Mediterranean route, crossing the sea from Libya or Egypt. A smaller share makes use of the Eastern Mediterranean route (to Turkey and Greece) (Avis & Hebert, 2016). The cost to reach Europe varies depending on the routes and the obstacles faced. Generally, costs are estimated to range between USD 1,500 and USD 4,500 to get from Mogadishu in Somalia to Libya. Costs to move from Libya to Italy are estimated to be around USD 1,000-USD 2,000 (largely dependent on the boat used). Migrant with larger resources might obtain a visa and go directly to Turkey, from where they move on to Greece. The cost for this route is estimated to be around USD 7,000 (Vever, Le Coz, Malakooti, & Dillais, 2016).

Libya is the most important crossing point connecting Africa to Europe. The main migration hub in Libya is Tripoli where migrants can acquire various migration services for their onward migration (Lutterbeck,

et al., 2015; Sahan, 2016). Coming from Sudan, the route follows Libya's southern border through the towns of Qatrun, Murzuq and Umm Al-Aranib, before continuing onwards to the town of Kufra in south-eastern Libya. From Kufra, a geographically and strategically important smuggling hub, migrants either move westwards along smaller routes through the desert to then join the major flow coming from Sebha, or they head northwest to Tazirbu, Zillah and eventually to Bani Walid. These routes are popular as they pass through the heart of the Sahara Desert, implying little to almost no surveillance. Although Libya has a coastline of more than 1,770km, the vast majority of departures of migrant boats come from a concentrated 200km long section of the shoreline, where a significant smuggling architecture has developed. This high-intensity route saw more than 180,000 migrants cross in 2016 (Reitano, Tinti, Shaw, & Bird, 2017).

During the course of 2016, growing insurgencies in Libya led to a movement from smugglers to divert migrants from Khartoum to Egypt. While historically, Egypt was never known as a key migration hub, the country is now evolving to become a key point of transit and collection (Vever, Le Coz, Malakooti, & Dillais, 2016). By August 2016, 10,112 (8.8%) of the approximately 115,068 arrivals in Italy had departed from Egypt. This represents an increase to the figures of the previous years, when 7.2% of total arrivals in Italy had departed from Egypt during the same period in 2015 (Reitano, Tinti, Shaw, & Bird, 2017). Three main routes from Sudan into Egypt are commonly used, namely the Aswan-Abu Simbel-Lake Nasser route, the Halayeb-Shalateen route and the East Oweinat route. The two key smuggling hubs in Egypt appear to be Cairo and Alexandria, in addition to multiple rural locations outside of Alexandria in northern Egypt (ibid).

Irrespective of if the journey is started from Libya or Egypt, the main arrival point in Europe for Somali nationals is Italy, as is also suggested by DTM's flow monitoring data. According to IOM data (2016), between January and October 2016, 6,698 Somalis had arrived in Italy by sea, compared to 11,020 between January and October 2015. In line with these figures, Somali migrants made up 8 per cent of total arrivals to Italy in 2015, and represented the third largest group arriving from the SSA after Eritrea and Nigeria. While the arrivals have decreased in absolute numbers, the trend of the first half of 2016 was continued, with Somali nationals still making up 6% of arrivals along the central Mediterranean route (IOM, 2016; RMMS, 2016a).

Risks and Vulnerabilities en route in Sudan and Libya

Somali migrants face significant risks during their journeys on all parts of the routes. However, data, including the Italy FMS (2016) and RMMS' 4Mi website, suggests that the situation in Sudan and Libya are to be the worst ones. Somali migrants face kidnapping, extortion, physical and sexual abuse, scarcity of food and water, as well as missing persons and deaths (RMMS, 2016a). Sudan has become known for

a high rate of abductions and kidnappings from criminal/smuggler groups. The RMMS (2016a) study mentioned the Rift Valley Institute research which reports that 85% of Somali youth (from Somaliland and Puntland) migrating to Europe had been held for ransom at least once during their journey, and almost 60% more than once. Migrants are particularly vulnerable if they enter into arrangements with smugglers that offer “go-now-pay-later” packages. Those offers are particularly susceptible to exploitation and abuse as the smugglers hold all the power over the migrant, often resulting in bonded labour or in holding the migrant until the debt is paid off, either by the migrants themselves or through help of their family back in Somalia (Reitano, Tinti, Shaw, & Bird, 2017). Those practices of “go-now-pay-later” are often associated with the group of *Magafes*¹¹. Next to exploitation through the collection of debt after the migrant has arrived, *Magafes* are also known for commonly capturing migrants and extorting a ransom (Majidi, 2016). Those who are unable to pay are brought into forced labour, for instance at commercial bee keeping farms in the desert, or in worst cases even sold on to traffickers or organ harvesters (Reitano, Tinti, Shaw, & Bird, 2017).

Similar cases of violence, abuse and exploitation appear to occur en route in Libya. Crawley et al (2016a) speak of long enduring racism and racial discrimination against black African migrants in Libya. The list of exploitative activities in Libya is long and includes violent detention, being held hostage for the payment of a ransom, bonded labour, sexual violence against women and in some cases even being sold into slavery (Malakooti, 2016). Traffickers take advantage of the situation by promising migrants ‘greener pasture’ in Europe and by offering to lend them money or to even pay for the whole journey. Upon arrival in Libya, migrants are sold into bonded labour and required to pay off their debts. Many migrants also report arbitrary arrests and detentions as they frequently get kidnapped upon their arrival and are required to pay a ransom. If they cannot pay, they are put into a detention centre and coerced to work in slave-like conditions (Malakooti, 2016; IOM, 2015). Migrants from the Horn of Africa are known to be living in a certain neighborhood of Tripoli. Most try to stay close to their homes as they are aware of the risks of being taken into detention centers, robbed or beaten by gangs. Treatment of migrants from the Horn as well as from West Africa is assumed to be the most harsh and arbitrary (Frouws, 2014a; Sahan, 2016).

4.3.3 Risks and vulnerabilities faced in Europe

On the journey from Libya to Italy, the sea crossing is the most dangerous part (Fargues & Bonfanti, 2014). According to UNHCR (2014) data, the increase of sea crossings to Italy has been accompanied by

¹¹ “The term ‘Magafe’ can be translated roughly as ‘the one who never misses’, however it is misleading in its allusion to a single powerful player. Instead, the term is used by Somalis to refer to individual traffickers, militias, and border control officials operating across the route, though the term is most often used in relation to groups operating on the border between Sudan and Libya” (Reitano, Tinti, Shaw, & Bird, 2017)

a rising death toll, with deaths occurring in the Mediterranean making up 73 per cent of the total number of deaths at sea globally. The total number of death in the Mediterranean has been increasing steadily since 2013. In 2015, of the 3,772 migrants who had drowned while crossing to Italy, 356 were from the Horn of Africa and 1,220 from general SSA (IOM, 2015). In early 2016 close to 4,000 migrants lost their lives and according to the IOM “Missing Migrants Project”, by the end of 2016 a total of 5,098 migrants were recorded to have lost their lives at sea while trying to cross the Mediterranean and reach Italy by boat (Malakooti & Davin, 2015b; Malakooti A. , 2015a; IOM, 2017). The conditions that migrants face while crossing the Mediterranean explain the large number of deaths every year. Smugglers in Libya are known to overload boats with often up to 200 migrants, even though the vessels are mainly built for 30 – 40 people. Food, water and fuel are often packed in insufficient quantities. Lastly, journeys should ideally last a day or two, however, depending on the conditions, they often take up to ten days (Malakooti, 2015a; Reitano, Adal, & Shaw, 2014).

In contrast to commonly held assumptions, migrants continue to be vulnerable on European soil where they face new risks. Scholars speak of post-migration risk factors, such as psychological problems, which applies particularly for populations that were exposed to mass trauma and displacement (Warfa, et al., 2012; Malakooti A. , 2016). Warfa et al. (2012) categorize those risk factors in five categories, namely “personal safety”, “attachment and bond maintenance”, “identity and role-functioning”, “justice” and “existential meaning”. A delay in receiving refugee status may for instance negatively affect the safety system by introducing fear of return to the country of departure. Furthermore, the attachment-bonding system may be affected when the unification with family members is not possible and the identity/role system may suffer as full engagement in society through employment or education is often impossible given the unknown statuses of migrants. Similarly, negative attitudes and discrimination in host country populations may affect the system of safety, but also of the attachment-bonding system and identity/role systems. Those findings are supported with research conducted by the Open Society Foundation in 2015, which looks at the situation of Somali nationals living in different European cities. The study also finds that experiences of discrimination and racism severely impacts a migrant’s participation and sense of belonging as well as their identification with the host society.

THEMATIC AREA 3 – DATA GAPS

Literature and data related to migratory routes from Somalia to Europe have been well documented over the past years. In line with the increased research and information related to routes and transit points used by Somali migrants to reach Europe, the literature on vulnerabilities and problems faced by Somali migrants along those routes has expanded. Nevertheless, most recent studies that focus on vulnerabilities of Somali migrants to Europe are of qualitative nature and there is a lack of quantitative representative samples that provide in-depth information on this topic.

In final, various literature acknowledges that Somali migrants are aware of potential risks, however current information tends to generalize migrants' awareness of risks. Largely explained by the fact that most of those studies are of qualitative nature which creates a lack of in-depth (quantitative) data that outlines the specificities of those risks and related risk awareness Somali migrants to Europe have.

4.4 THEMATIC AREA 4 – THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARIES

Understanding the routes migrants take from Somalia towards Europe is essential in order to get a clearer picture of the roles of intermediaries and their services. This section provides a general overview of smuggling activities in the Horn of Africa and Sahel region before elaborating upon the profiles and services of intermediaries for Somali nationals and explaining the constellation of networks.

For migrants travelling from the Horn of Africa towards North Africa, a smuggler becomes mandatory. This is not only due to the numerous hazards encountered on the roads, ranging from militia groups to national armies groups with a shoot-to-kill policy, but also due to the Sahara itself being an unnavigable death-trap for those without specialized knowledge and significant pre-planning (Shaw, 2016). Irregular movement is highly commoditised in the region, and smugglers run the entire spectrum of the smuggling industry, from small local players to hierarchical transnational players (Reitano, Tinti, Shaw, & Bird, 2017). The general term of "migrant smuggler" includes a very wide spectrum of actors: it can range from concerned citizens assisting those seeking refuge by offering for instance a ride across a border, to a highly organized transnational crime network providing upscale service, such as the procurement of tickets, false documentation, or a corridor of corrupt officials who help to reduce the barriers to cross a border point (Shaw, 2016). In general, but also for the purpose of this study, smuggling refers only to

the facilitation of migration related services, especially the irregular entry of a foreign national into a third country in exchange for payments.

In their research, Reitano, Adal and Shaw (2014) distinguish between three different kinds of smuggling services:

1. **Ad hoc smuggling services:** The migrant travels on their own, occasionally using smuggling services, for example to cross a border.
2. **Migrant smuggling through misuse or abuse of documents:** Migrants who can afford to use this type of smuggling often have sufficient financial resources to purchase visas and other necessary papers.
3. **Pre-organized stage-to-stage smuggling:** The whole journey is organized and migrants are accompanied for most of it by smugglers.

4.4.1 Facilitators' Services and Profiles

In Vever et al.'s (2016) study, most of the youth (57%) that was interviewed thought it was easy to find a smuggler (often referred to as *magafe* or *mukhala*) as they knew how and where to find them. Smugglers have well-established offices in cities such as Mogadishu or Kismayo. Smugglers rarely get involved in the logistics at the final destination but rather focus on the different routes leading to Europe, specializing in a specific route, such as the East Africa route to Libya, connections in the Gulf countries or in Southern Africa. For the migrants that are better off, smugglers often arrange the issuance of fake documents, for example counterfeiting passports from Ethiopia or Kenya (ibid). The journey to Sudan starts via Ethiopia where other *mukhalas* are met to facilitate the crossing of the Ethiopian-Sudanese border. The network structure for the route from the Horn to Europe appears to rely on both smugglers as well as brokers, so called connection men. The brokers/ connection men, most of the times of the same origin as the migrants themselves, establish the initial contact between the migrant and the smuggler, the latter usually owning the safe houses, vehicles, boats etc. While brokers are commonly referred to as 'connection men', the smugglers are known as 'pushing men' (Lutterbeck, 2013; Sahan, 2016). Both the smugglers as well as the brokers usually have connections to brokers and smugglers in other relevant countries, i.e. Ethiopian smugglers know Sudanese smugglers and those in turn have connections to smugglers from Libya. Generally, local brokers initiate the first contact directly or through family members/friends. The brokers facilitate transportation to neighbouring areas where migrants are collected, often in so called safe houses and then handed over to more organized criminal groups. Those groups are in many cases based on family, clan or close friendship links and operate within local territories (Reitano, Tinti, Shaw, & Bird, 2017). Some migrants also indicated to have organized the journey

through their own personal networks, borrowing passports that belong to family members or friends that were already naturalized in a European country, a practice known as the “look-alike method” (Moret, 2007)

4.4.2 Role of Networks

Even though the smuggling networks operating from the Horn of Africa towards Europe are often labelled as “loose affiliations” (Reitano, Adal, & Shaw, 2014; RMMS, 2015; Avis & Hebert, 2016) since they often lack clear hierarchical or sophisticated structures, this becomes questionable when looking at the connection and networks between the different countries, smugglers and brokers. The perception of loose affiliations is most likely associated with the fact that migrant smuggling from SSA is not organized as a single and complete process, where one smuggler in Somalia arranges everything from the beginning to the end, but that it is rather split into many different parts, involving several smugglers. In fact, a study by the Sahan Foundation (2016), describes the entire smuggling and trafficking process in the Horn as involving “sophisticated and integrated international networks that derive massive profits from the mass movement of thousands of migrants and refugees, often in aggravated circumstances” (p. 18). The networks are interlinked through cross-border communications and operations, mainly between Europe (notably Italy), Libya, Ethiopia, and Sudan (ibid). As mentioned in the previous section, those networks include both brokers/connection men and smugglers/pushing men. Given the complex transnational nature of these networks, combating them effectively will require an equally sophisticated multilateral approach. As described by Reitano et al. (2017), as soon as a migrant has made initial contact with a local smuggler or smuggling network, they are subsequently connected to a larger organized transnational network. This network then ensures that an individual arriving from Somalia is put in touch with another smuggler in Sudan, and at the moment that the migrant leaves for Libya or Egypt, he/she is put in contact with another connection man who facilitates the section into and across Europe (ibid).

Throughout the smuggling network there are four main payment methods, namely cash in hand along the route, the use of third-party guarantors (typically family members or prospective employers), the informal hawala payment system in instalments, and the more recent ‘go-now-pay-later’ system. Not only for the payment method but for the whole facilitation of smuggling networks, social contacts and networks, including the diaspora in destination states are very important. For instance, analysis in Sudan showed that a potential migrant will have most likely already been connected to smugglers through their social networks, through relatives or friends (Reitano, Tinti, Shaw, & Bird, 2017). Furthermore, social media also plays a crucial role for the functioning of smuggling networks. Before leaving, migrants usually want to obtain recommendations and contact details about smugglers from those that have previously and successfully migrated (ibid).

THEMATIC AREA 4 – DATA GAPS

The role intermediaries play before and during the journey of Somali migrants to Europe has recently not been studied widely. Information on the role of smuggling networks and profiles of intermediaries in both Somalia and transit countries is limited and scattered. Limited existing literature is often of qualitative nature and reflects various different views regarding classification of networks and smuggler activities from the Horn of Africa to Europe. Structured and quantitative data that provides insights on the actual 'services' provided by intermediaries and how smuggling networks are used and function is largely missing.

4.5 THEMATIC AREA 5 – MIGRANTS' PERCEPTION TOWARDS EUROPE

There is no exclusive research undertaken on this thematic area for Somali nationals. Nevertheless, certain studies that focus on migration towards Europe highlight some general perceptions of migrants. Vever et al. (2016) touch upon this topic and recognize the importance of obtaining a better understanding of migrants' perception towards Europe.

As already mentioned in section two, migration from Somalia, especially by the youth, is often fuelled by the perception of relative inequality. Therefore, it is not surprising that in Vever et al.'s (2016) study, "finding a job" was the third most commonly reported reason (after security concerns) for young Somalis. The perception is that there are more job opportunities as well as higher wages available in Europe. Even wages that are considered low for European standards (e.g. 1,000 to 1,500 USD a month) are five to ten times higher than average wages in Somalia. Jobs and higher wages are included in the desire of having better life opportunities which is one of the main migration motivation for young Somalis (Ahmed, 2015). A lot of this information is obtained by migrants through access to information and exposure to the Western culture, including through social media and television, as well as witnessing Somali diaspora returnees with better living standards (Vever, Le Coz, Malakooti, & Dillais, 2016). Furthermore and surprisingly, Europe is also perceived as being the easiest destination country to reach, despite the arduous and perilous nature of the journey from East Africa through North Africa to Europe (ibid). It is important to note here that the perception of Europe as the easiest region to reach is apparently not related to the conditions of the journey but rather the knowledge that migrants will face limited border

controls or checkpoints in Libya, therewith limiting the chances of being detected, due to the enduring crisis, making entry and exit much easier (ibid).

Another common perception of Somali migrants seems to be that by entering Europe, migrants will be able to gain a foreign passport over time. This picture is obtained from other Somalis who have been granted refugee status and, in a following step, received full citizenship. It is further assumed that those perceptions are often fuelled by a wrong understanding of European migration policies. High quality welfare and health systems as well as high quality education are reported to be other common perceptions and expectations upon arrival in Europe. Sweden, the UK, Denmark and Norway are perceived to be the most welcoming countries of Somali nationals, since they have large established Somali communities. Somali migrants also associate certain political systems with these countries (especially Sweden), including democracy, a humanitarian system and functioning social policies. After leaving everything behind in Somalia while also holding high expectations, it comes as a surprise to many migrants when they face exclusion and/or discrimination upon their arrival within the host-society, often based on their different cultural, ethnic and religious identities (Haandrikman & Hassanen, 2014).

THEMATIC AREA 5 – DATA GAPS

The thematic area on Somali migrants' perceptions towards Europe seems to be largely understudied and despite more recent initiatives to collect data on the topic, namely on nationals from Afghanistan or Iraq, limited data exist for Somali migrants. Although the importance of the topic seems to be acknowledged within the international and academic community, only few studies do actually focus on this thematic area.

To gain a better understanding of movements from Somalia to Europe, further research related to migrants' perceptions of destination countries in Europe is crucial. In this regard, it is necessary to investigate what Somali migrants know before migration and what sources of information they use before migrating to Europe, whilst studying if decisions/ perceptions are based upon this information. To further fill current gaps comprehensive data collection should also focus on what expectations migrants have about the route to Europe, general life in Europe and their potential new lives in Europe, whilst capturing key information sources that influence those views.

4.6 THEMATIC AREA 6 – MIGRATION OPTIONS

4.6.1 Legal Options in Europe

For Somali nationals and third-country nationals in general, the EU has a number of measures and directives in place that would allow them to enter the EU legally. The Blue Card directive for example allows highly-qualified immigrant workers to access the EU labour market. Family reunification provides already legally residing immigrants the chance to bring family members into the EU. The directive on the entry and stay of students, volunteers and interns establishes common rules for young immigrants' entry in to EU territory. Furthermore, the seasonal workers directive ensures the rights of third-country nationals and aims at preventing irregular immigration (Eurostat, 2015). Thus, the legal options and routes for nationals from the Horn of Africa are predominantly reserved to the highly-skilled who are attracted by the policies in place and who have the means to navigate these legal channels (Addis, 2014).

4.6.2 Regular vs Irregular Migration from Somalia

Research on potential migrants from the Horn of Africa found that most migrants intended to travel legally whenever this option exist, for instance to the Middle East through Public Employment Agencies (PEAs) or to Western countries through scholarships, the Green Card (USA) or the Blue Card (EU). Yet, the interviewed individuals were also willing to travel irregular if regular channels were not possible. In addition, the often perceived inefficiency of the legal system results in some migrants turning to irregular channels (Frouws, 2014a). A large number of Somali nationals that migrate to Europe take an irregular route as their comparative advantage is believed to be higher. The cost of migration for instance was reported to strongly influence the decision of taking an irregular route as many Somali migrants believe it is cheaper to travel through irregular channels (ibid). In order to be able to finance their migration journey to Europe, migrants reported to have sold assets, for example in form of inheritances, including valuable jewellery, as well as land, houses and livestock (e.g. goats or camels) (Abdirahman, 2015). Those findings are also supported by Reitano et al.'s (2017) study, which states that house sales have increased in towns that are known for high outflows of migrants.

4.6.3 Choosing Europe over Regional Migration

As research and figures in the profile section outlined, Somali nationals chose much more frequently regional migration over migration to Europe. Nevertheless, the number of Somalis that face the often harsh and arduous travel conditions described previously to reach Europe is significant. The analysis of migrants' perceptions of Europe partially explains why it is among the main preferred destinations. The expectations of enhanced security and better livelihood opportunities in particular are primarily associ-

ated with Western countries as well as the presence of existing communities and families is an important factor in the choice of destination. Research on this thematic area reveals that not all migrants reaching Europe had intended to do so at the beginning of their journey. Many plan on travelling to the Gulf States or Libya and change their destination en route. Worsening living conditions in Libya are named as one of the reasons why migrants who initially never planned to go to Europe, eventually end up crossing the Mediterranean Sea (Crawley, Düvell, Jones, McMahon, & Sigona, 2016a).

In Reitano et al's (2017) study the findings show that for most migrants their primary goal was to escape the push-factors, i.e. conflict, violence and economic hardship and to improve their position. Respondents did acknowledge that there are other options than just Europe to achieve those conditions and reported that they would consider other destinations than Europe as long as they fulfilled the criteria. It appears that opportunities offered and relative cost played a greater role than physical risk in the decision making about how, where and when to move.

Some of the Somali youth are optimistic about the country's future and reported they would rather stay than leave. Of the youth surveyed in Vever et al's (2017) study, 63 per cent stated that the best opportunities were within the country. In terms of age breakdown, it was predominantly the respondents between 14 and 19 that appeared to be more inclined to seek opportunities abroad (59%), while of the respondents that were older than 25 (69%) thought better opportunities actually existed in Somalia.

THEMATIC AREA 6 – DATA GAPS

Despite the fact that various literature acknowledges that regional/intercontinental migration from Somalia is much larger than extra-continental, only limited research focusses exclusively on this thematic area. Existing quantitative research that is available related to the decision-making process of Somali migrants and why Somali nationals choose one European country over another often fails to in-depthly address the precise reasons why Somali migrants take this extra step and move towards Europe instead of staying in the region.

New studies of both qualitative as well as quantitative nature could help fill the above gaps and shed light on particularly the decision to migrate to Europe versus regional migration alternatives.

5. SUMMARY OF KEY-FINDINGS

In line with the thematic areas and the research questions, information and data collected under the literature review reveal that various thematic areas have more significant data-gaps than others. The main data gaps for each of the thematic areas are outlined below. Gaps which are visible in almost all of the TAs is the **lack of comprehensive quantitative data as well as data that particularly focuses on the movements towards Europe** and not to the Middle East or within the African continent.

| TA 1 | TA 2 | TA 3 | TA 4 | TA 5 | TA 6 |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Migrant profiles (socio-demographic) | Migration drivers and decision making | Vulnerability factors in origin transit and destination countries | Role of intermediaries | Migrants' perceptions towards Europe | Migration options and choices |

Thematic Area 1 – In recent years there has been a growing effort amongst international actors and researchers to increase a better understanding of the profiles of migrants that move to Europe. Although methods such as DTM’s flow monitoring surveys provide regular updates on the profiles of Somali migrants towards Europe, most information is collected in transit locations and socio-economic profiles of Somali migrants in their **country of origin (before migration)**, as well as **in the destination countries** have failed to receive greater attention. In final, Somalia as a country, is also **lacking effective tools to capture basic migrant related characteristics** of its citizens in **household surveys or censuses**.

Thematic Area 2 – In recent years, various data on migration drivers and decision-making factors of migrants from the Horn of Africa, including Somali nationals, have been collected. However, data is mainly focussed on macro-level drivers, leaving **significant gaps of information on micro-level drivers** of Somali migrants to Europe. The **core gap is a representative sample that focusses both on macro and micro level** migration drivers and decision-making factors of Somali nationals that migrate towards Europe.

Thematic Area 3 – Quantitative, (large-scale) survey data on **risks and vulnerabilities faced by Somali migrants en route remain scarce**. The majority of literature that report on risks and vulnerabilities Somali migrants face in transit are of **anecdotal nature and often represented by small sample sizes**. Moreover, recently collected qualitative or quantitative data does not provide detailed information **regarding the actual awareness Somali migrants have before departure related to the potential risks and vulnerabilities** they could face whilst migrating to Europe.

Thematic Area 4 – Only limited and often anecdotal information on the role intermediaries play in facilitating the journeys of Somali migrants to Europe is available. Various literature outline information related to the **operational aspects of human-smuggling, smuggling networks and information regarding smuggler profiles**. Unfortunately, the literature does not appear to be coherent and authors disagree on the classification of networks and smuggler activities from the Horn of Africa to Europe as sophisticated and integrated structures or as rather loose and sporadic relationships. **Structured (quantitative) data collection is needed to fill the current gaps and obtain insights on what role intermediaries play** and how smuggling networks are used by Somali migrants to reach Europe.

Thematic Area 5 – This thematic area is understudied despite more recent initiatives to collect data on migrants' perceptions towards Europe. To obtain a better understanding of movements from Somalia to Europe, **further research related to migrants' perceptions of destination countries in Europe is crucial**. In this regard, it is necessary to investigate what Somali migrants know before migration and the **sources of information** they use before migrating to Europe, whilst studying if decisions/ perceptions are based upon this information. To further fill the current data gaps, comprehensive data collection should also focus on what **expectations migrants have** about the route to Europe, general life in Europe and their potential new lives in Europe, whilst capturing key information sources that influence those views.

Thematic Area 6 – Although various sources do provide information on legal channels to Europe as well as on regional alternatives, literature fails to address the precise reasons that pushes some Somali migrants to take the lengthier journey and move towards Europe instead of staying inside the region. The limited data that does exist is mostly of qualitative nature and often focuses on the Horn of Africa as a whole, but fails to address the different countries individually. New studies of both qualitative as well as quantitative nature could help **fill the gaps** under this thematic area **and particularly shed light on the decision made by Somalis to migrate within the region versus Europe**.

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